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ABSTRACT
The historiography of the Cuban Revolution includes numerous accounts which detail the
responses to Batista’s coup. The fact that anti-Batista sentiments were very popular in Cuba, and that
several revolutionary groups existed has also been highly documented. Nonetheless, the most highly
recognized insurrectional organization remains Castro’s M-26-7. The goal of my thesis is to explain the
steps which Castro took in order to remove all competition, allowing him to remain the only figure left in
power.
The process in which Castro came to power will be analyzed in order to gain a better
understanding of how he orchestrated the removal of other revolutionary groups. My thesis will show
that Castro purposely aided some groups, when it was to his benefit, but also denied aid to these same
groups when he knew that he could gain an advantage over them. An analysis of the manifestos will
reveal that most anti-Batista groups had their own agendas and that often times they were attempting
to work together in order to coordinate Cuba’s future. I will focus on primary source materials such as
eye witness accounts, historical publications, diaries and newspapers. I intend on analyzing Castro’s M26-7, from the time of his attack of the Moncada Barracks, through the course of the insurrection itself,
and his final actions as Batista fled Cuba in 1959.
By investigating the actions that were taken by Castro and his followers, in light of how those
actions affected the other revolutionaries groups, will shed light on why certain decision were made by
the M-26-7. The outcome of this research will show that the M-26-7 orchestrated their actions with the
sole purpose of bringing Castro to power when the insurrection war was over.
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INTRODUCTION
The Cuban insurrectionary period is a topic that has been widely covered; however, the
details on the events vary concerning how Castro became Cuba’s “supreme leader.” Questions
still remain, some of which may never be answered due to the Cuban government’s high levels
of secrecy. In this thesis, my aim is to critically analyze Castro’s actions in relation to the
commitments he made in the manifestos and in doing so I will demonstrate that Castro’s agenda
was not solely the removal of Batista, but also the concentration of power to his organization.
Although the opposition groups had various agendas, many attempted to work together. They
crafted and co-signed manifestos throughout the insurrectionary period which lasted roughly
from 1953-1958, in which they agreed to unify their forces and establish the terms under which
Cuba would be run after the fall of Batista.
The revolutionary manifestos were written by these groups with the purpose of declaring
their intentions and expressing the ideas of their respective organizations.1Some of the most
important anti-Batista organizations were the Revolutionary Directorate (DR), the Auténtico
Party (AP) under the direction of Carlos Prío, the Second Front of the Escambray, the July 26
Movement (M-27-7), the Ortodoxo Party and minimally the Popular Socialist Party (PSP).2
Their attempts at compromise, through the use of pacts can shed light on some of the events, and
how Castro undermined these groups for personal gain.

1

Llerena, Mario. The Unsuspected Revolution: The Birth and Rise of Castroism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1978, 63.
2
The Ortodoxo Party was created by Eduardo Chibás as a direct competitor to the Auténtico Party’s reputation of
political corruption.
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Since Castro’s triumphal march on Havana on January 8, 1959, much has been written
concerning the Cuban insurrectionary period and the actions that took place therein. The official
story being told from the perspective of the Cuban government often fails to convey the events as
they actually occurred. The antagonism between the opposition groups is completely ignored
and the official government account makes it appear that they worked together with the aim of
defeating Batista. Most of the participants that are now in the exile community have attempted
to tell their stories through various mediums. Many were encouraged to document their
participation in the insurrection so that their perspectives would not be overlooked by the Cuban
revolutionary government’s rewriting of history with their focus primarily on the guerrilla
movement.
Table 1: Primary Manifestos
Manifesto
Mexico Pact
Manifesto of the Sierra Maestra
Miami Pact
Pact of Caracas

Date
August 30, 1956
July 12, 1957
November 1, 1957
July 20, 1958

The manifestos written during the insurrectionary period are important because they
demonstrate the contributions of the opposition groups that were fundamental to the ousting of
Batista. This work will deal with some of the most significant manifestos.3 Chapter one will
detail the importance of the Mexico Pact, an agreement made in Mexico between Fidel Castro
and José Antonio Echeverría on August 30, 1956. This pact would signify the unity of the M-26-

3

See Table One – Primary Manifestos
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7 and the DR, indicating that both groups would support one another with the mutual goal of
removing Batista. Chapter two discusses the Manifesto of the Sierra Maestra (MSM), which was
written by Castro and signed by both Raúl Chibás and Felipe Pazos on July 12, 1957.4 It called
for the unity of all opposition groups, and urged all political parties to oppose an electoral
solution and to refuse any negotiation with the Batista government. The second chapter also
discusses, the Miami Pact which was signed four months later on November 1st by
representatives of several opposition parties in exile.
Table 2: Secondary Manifestos
Manifesto

Date

Montreal Pact

June 2, 1953
August 8, 1955
December 10, 1955
March 12, 1958
June 11, 1957
December 1, 1958

Manifesto #1 to the People of Cuba
Manifesto #2 to the People of Cuba
Total War against the Tyranny Manifesto
The Manifesto of the Five
The Pedrero Pact

Its purpose was to unify the opposition forces in order to remove Batista, and to establish
a temporary government after his removal. Castro would strongly oppose the pact, lashing out at
all who signed it, including two representatives of the M-26-7, Felipe Pazos and Léster
Rodrígues. The third chapter will discuss the Caracas Pact, signed in Caracas, Venezuela on July
20, 1958. Established as a final call for the unity of the opposition forces and the acceptance of
guerrilla warfare, the Caracas Pact was also an attempt by Castro to establish a legitimate

4

Raúl Chibás was the brother of Eduardo Chibás and an anti-Batista activist. Felipe Pazos was an economist that
served as the President of the Cuban National Bank under the Prío administration.
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leadership role for himself and the M-26-7. The events in Caracas will lead to the Pedrero Pact
signed on December 1, 1958, which gave Ernesto Guevara, a major in Castro’s guerilla army, a
leadership position over the Escambray guerillas and a small unit of PSP guerillas in the area of
the Escambray Mountains. These pacts, as well as some less significant pacts, will be used as
windows into the dealings of Castro and his July 26 Movement in order to illustrate his
subsequent rise to power.5

Background to the Insurrection
The history of Cuba’s revolution began with Fulgencio Batista’s coup d’état against
President Carlos Prío Socarrás, just eighty-one days prior to the presidential election of
1952.6Prío had been elected president of Cuba on July 1, 1948 as the candidate of the Partido
Revolucionario Cubana – Auténtico (PRC). Having replaced President Grau San Martin, whose
administration was plagued with corruption, Prío was expected to be a much needed
improvement. Prío himself would eventually continue in line with Cuba’s history of political
corruption.7Prío had been democratically elected, which gave him legitimacy, something that the
Batista regime lacked, having come to power through a military coup.
After the coup d'état many Cubans expressed their discontent with the Batista
government, but the fear of police violence against protestors caused the general public to remain
cautious. Even Prío, who had been thrown out of office by Batista, fled Cuba rather than to face
the growing government repression against anyone that dared to oppose the newly installed

5

All major pacts are listed in the Appendix.
Pérez-Stable, Marifeli. The Cuban Revolution: Origins, Course and Legacy. New York, NY: Oxford University Press,
2009, 52.
7
Pérez Jr., Louis A. Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2006, 216-217.
6
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Batista regime. As disapproval of the regime continued to grow, one of the most active sectors
of the population was the youth, particularly university student groups. The youth of this period
had come to be known as the “centennial generation.” In 1952 the centennial generation was
celebrating the birth of Cuba’s martyred hero, José Martí. The youth groups stood against
Batista in hopes of continuing Martí’s dreams of sovereignty and social justice for the island of
Cuba.8
These student groups organized protests and demonstrations which were met with
indiscriminate police violence, injuring not only demonstrators but innocent civilians as well.
The increasing state violence only helped to intensify the public, many of which already opposed
Batista and drew them to sympathize with the protesters. This caused many Cubans to speak out
against the Batista government, not only because he had gained his power unconstitutionally, but
also because it continued the political corruption that had been notorious throughout Cuba’s
history.
An organization that would come to play a very minimal role in the insurrection was the
PSP. Many of the PSP members were long-established traditionalists that had supported Batista
during his first term as president.9 In return for their support, several members of the communist
party had been given cabinet positions during that term. It is because of this many PSP members
continued to stand with Batista, even if just to maintain positions within the government. From
the beginning of the struggle against Batista, the PSP criticized the violence of both Castro’s M26-7 and the DR. When it became evident that Castro was gaining enough momentum to

8

Suchlicki, Jamie. University Students and Revolution in Cuba, 1920-1968. Miami, FL,: University of Miami Press,
1969.
9
Staten, L. Clifford. The History of Cuba. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, 58.
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overthrow Batista, several members of the PSP decided to join the insurrection. While the idea
of associating with communists was unpopular with the majority of the opposition groups and
the Cuban population in general, Castro welcomed their aid and rewarded them for their efforts.
The other groups that took part in the insurrection were ignored when Batista fled the
country. Castro and the M-26-7 immediately took power and all the other opposition groups
seemed to have lost steam as Castro took the lead and painted himself as Cuba’s long awaited
revolutionary messiah. Although some of the opposition groups tried to oppose Castro’s selfimposed leadership role, they found themselves overshadowed by the living legend that Castro
had become by claiming that it was the M-26-7 in the mountains that had been the major reason
for the victory. As the other opposition groups were overlooked, it became clear that Castro had
simply made agreements in the manifestos as a way to secure power and Castro’s involvement in
the signing of the pacts was simply a means to an end.
By examining the manifestos that were written throughout the insurrection, in relation to
Castro’s actions, one is able to gain a better understanding of Castro’s activities behind the
scenes. Castro’s undertakings in relation to the opposition groups that he coordinated with, will
demonstrate how, with a rag-tag guerrilla force which was greatly outnumbered by Cuba’s
military, Castro was able to take over leadership of the country after Batista’s departure. I will
demonstrate that the goal of the M-26-7, during the inception of the insurrection, was not to
bring Castro to power, but simply to remove Batista from power. As the insurrection proceeded
Castro began a transition from being the leader of the M-26-7, to the leader of the entire antiBatista movement. This would come about because while Castro waged a rebellion against

6

Batista’s army, he also maneuvered against the other anti-Batista groups, all which were vying
for power.
In order to establish himself as one of the primary leaders of the insurrection, Castro
created rivalries with other opposition groups, masked behind pacts of unity. This will be shown
by an examination of other sources such as articles from journalists that visited Castro’s hideout
in the Sierra Maestra, memoirs of some of the participating rebels, as well as an evaluation of the
pacts themselves. I intend to shed light on how Castro went from being a relative outsider during
the signing of the Montreal Pact on June 2, 1953, to being named the Commander in Chief of the
rebel army by the time the Caracas Pact was signed on July 20, 1958.10
I will also show that Castro was able to take advantage of the agreements summarized in
the manifestos published throughout the course of the insurrection in order to obtain a position of
power over the other opposition groups, with the purpose of strengthening his own movement.
Each of the manifestos has significant value when viewed in light of the actions of Castro and
the M-26-7. By using these documents as windows into the actions taken, we can see that for
Castro, ulterior motives existed, outside of what had been agreed to in the manifestos
themselves.

10

Bonachea, Ramón L. and San Martín, Martha. The Cuban Insurrection, 1952-1959. New Brunswick, New Jersey:
Transaction Books, 1974, 17.
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CHAPTER 1: CASTRO, FROM STUDENT ACTIVIST TO GUERRILLA LEADER
Castro’s introduction to politics and his road to rebelliousness began while he was a
student at the University of Havana. From this point we will see a steady progression beginning
with Castro’s actions in what was known as the grupos de accion, as he evolves into a leader of
the Moncada Barracks attack, and eventually a political and rebel leader with the M-26-7.11 The
evidence shows that in a short period of time Castro was able to make a name for himself in
Cuba. Although he was not seen as a viable option for a position of political leadership, from the
early years of the insurrection Castro knew that he would first need ardent followers if his
leadership role was going to development. His role in the University of Havana’s student
government power struggles prepared him for the future that lay in front of him and shows that
he was willing to do whatever it took to succeed, even if it meant violent confrontations with his
adversaries.
Castro’s reputation grew throughout his years at the University of Havana, in large part
due to his involvement in grupos de acciónthat were known for gangsterism. Castro’s
involvement with student politics led to him becoming known for excessive violence, and he was
even accused of murder for political gain.12 This reputation continued to follow him after he
completed his law university, and it was something that he would eventually have to deal with if
he wanted to be accepted as a legitimize leader in the anti-Batista struggle.

11

The grupos de acción were political groups within the universities which had a reputation for violence. They
benefited from the fact that the universities had autonomy from the government, which protected them from
police repression.
12
Thomas, Hugh. The Cuban Revolution: The History of Cuba since 1952. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers,
1977, 24-27. In pages 24–27 Thomas gives a detailed account of Castro’s violent reputation at the University of
Havana, including his being accused of the murder of a political rival.
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In 1952, Castro was nominated and ran as a candidate for Congress as an Ortodoxo.13Due
to Batista’s coup, the elections did not take place and within weeks constitutional freedoms were
suspended. This made Castro even more determined to remove Batista from power. Castro
attempted to take legal action against Batista for violating the constitution by usurping power,
the courts, however, refused to hear Castro’s indictments against the President. Castro decided
that a different course of action was necessary in order to eliminate Batista. Batista’s takeover of
the country was unconstitutional and legal means to defeat him were no longer an option. Castro
had grown from being a student activist to a political activist and the suspension of political
means led Castro to the realization that insurrection might be the only hopes of ending Cuba’s
governmental corruption.
As a result of Batista taking power, a meeting in Montreal had been arranged by deposed
president Prío, who decided to put aside any disagreements between the Auténtico and Ortodoxo
parties which may impede the removal of Batista. Although Castro was an Ortodoxo Party
member, at this point he was still a relatively unknown figure who lacked the significant political
importance to be invited to the meeting. Being that the majority of the participants were either
moderates, or centrists, the PSP was also not included. The Auténtico, Ortodoxo and Cuban
National Party (PNC) came together, along with several political figures such as former senators
Manuel de Varona and José M. Gutiérrez, former Vice-President Guillermo Alonso Pujol, and
Auténtico presidential candidate Carlos Hevia. On June 2, 1953 the Montreal Pact was signed,
with the participants agreeing on five major points.14 (1) It called for restoring the Constitution

13

Quirk, Robert E.Fidel Castro. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1993, page 56-57.
Bonachea, Ramón L. and San Martín, Marta. The Cuban Insurrection, 1952-1959. New Brunswick, New Jersey:
Transaction Books, 1974, 17.
14
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of 1940. (2) It was agreed that Batista was incapable of holding fair elections. (3) It declared
that a neutral provisional government would be set up to temporarily replace the Batista
government. (4) It stated that all signers would reject any forms of terrorism or attacks on
individuals throughout the struggle. (5) Lastly, it stated that the Auténticos and Ortodoxos
would carry out their objectives through appointed commissions, thus giving the various
organizations a sense of fairness in the creation of a new democratic government. This
agreement left many options available to its participants, so while some tried to pressure Batista
into leaving office so that fair elections could be held, others such as Prío could support a more
militant approach.
Castro had not been invited, nor mentioned throughout the proceedings that produced the
Montreal Pact. In response, Castro proclaimed that the pact did not offer a valid solution, but
rather more political banter. Rather than viewing the Montreal Pact as a alternative solution,
Castro viewed the meeting as a continuation of the same politicians whose corruption had been
destroying Cuba since its independence.15Ignoring the meeting in Montreal, Castro prepared for
the attack on the Moncada Barracks. He referred to the members of the Montreal meeting as
middle-aged politicians still receiving pensions and salaries from the Batista government that
would never conduct the real revolution that Cuba required, ignoring the fact that their pensions
were earned.16

15

De la Cova, Antonio Rafael. The Moncada Attack: Birth of the Cuban Revolution. Columbia: University of South
Carolina Press, 2007, 119-120.
16
Marquez-Sterling, Manuel. Cuba: 1952-1959, The True Story of Castro’s Rise to Power. Kleiopatria Digital Press,
2009, 50.
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On July 26, 1953 Castro, then twenty-six years old, orchestrated an attack on the
Moncada military barracks, the second most important military garrison in the country, and
Bayamo with the goal of inciting the masses in a widespread rebellion.17 Castro had hoped that
once he took the Moncada, his victory would encourage the people of Santiago to join him in
rebelling against Batista and his plan was to use the weapons stolen from the Moncada Barracks
to arm the people that would join him.18
Historian Antonio Rafael De la Cova has argued that Castro accelerated his plans for the
attack on the Moncada Barracks out of fear that the signers on the Montreal Pact would strike
first, therefore taking away from the impact of Castro’s assault on the military base.19De la Cova
explains that Castro, being aware that the Montreal Pact was looking for a democratic solution to
the coup, decided that Batista’s government could only be defeated through a popular
insurrection. To Castro and his supporters, the Montreal Pact lacked importance since it did not
offer solutions.
The attack on the Moncada Barracks failed almost immediately as Castro’s men were
heavily outnumbered and outgunned and were quickly forced to retreat. Both the Ortodoxo
Party and the Communist Party immediately expressed their disapproval of Castro’s actions at
Moncada and Bayamo.20 During the attack, sixteen of Castro’s men died in battle, and when it
was all over the majority of his followers were tortured and then killed after being captured or

17

Thomas, Hugh. The Cuban Revolution, 42.
Castro, Fidel. History Will Absolve Me. New York, NY: Fair Play for Cuba Committee, 1961,26-27
19
De la Cova, Antonio Rafael. The Moncada Attack, 119. De la Cova explains that the Moncada attack failed due to
lack of proper preparation by the M-26-7, which wanted to be the first to strike against the Batista.
20
Franqui, Carlos. El libro de los doce. México: Ediciones Era, 1966, 15.
18
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surrendering.21 A small minority of the group, including Castro and his brother Raúl, had
survived and they would all end up serving time in prison.
It was during his time in jail that Castro prepared his defense speech which would
become the text known as History Will Absolve Me.22 This was Castro’s first manifesto, and he
used it to explain the motivations behind the attack on the Moncada and Bayamo Barracks, as
well as his plans for a post-Batista Cuba. Instead of allowing the validation of the charges
against him, he indicted the judges themselves, stating that in incriminating him they were
serving a government that lacked legitimacy. Batista had not come to power through electoral
means and therefore was not a constitutional power. Castro argued that it was his duty as a
Cuban patriot to attempt to overthrow Batista in order to protect the constitution. Claiming that
his sentencing amounted to be a mockery of the very constitution that they were sworn to
protect, Castro argued that, “…the dictatorship that oppressed the nation is not a constitutional
power” and therefore the Moncada rebels had not only the right, but the duty as Cuban citizens to
overthrow Batista.23 In his defense speech Castro specifically referred to Oriente province’s
relevance in colonial Cuba’s history and mentioned its heroes in an attempt to bring to his
defense the Cuban spirit of rebelliousness against tyranny.24
Sentenced to fifteen years in prison, Castro spent the first several months of his sentence
speaking out against the regime while also trying to gain support for the M-26-7. While in
prison Castro wrote numerous letters to his followers and the media in an attempt to keep the

21

Coltman, Leycester. The Real Fidel Castro. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003, 82.
Castro, Fidel. History Will Absolve Me.
23
Castro, Fidel. History Will Absolve Me, 123.
24
Castro, Fidel. History Will Absolve Me, 123.
22

12

public informed about his new movement. He had called his group el Movimiento 26 de
Julio,(M-26-7), in commemoration of the Moncada attack. It can be seen from the letters that
Castro wrote while in prison that he intended to use propaganda as a driving force for his
struggle against the Batista regime. Many of Castro’s prison letters were written to Melba
Hernández, who was an ardent supporter of Castro’s movement and a fellow Moncadistas.25 She
had been released from prison after serving seven months and continued to rally support for
Castro.
In one of Castro’s letters to Hernández he wrote, “Propaganda cannot be abandoned for a
single minute, because it is the soul of every struggle. Ours should have its own style and adjust
itself to the circumstance.”26 As shall be seen, Castro used propaganda based on Cuban
nationalism and patriotism as a means to garner support throughout the insurrection. It shall also
be seen that as the insurrection gained momentum, Castro and the M-26-7 coordinated with other
organizations, agreeing to unify, but only when it benefited their own objectives. In the same
letter, Castro stated, “Deal with people artfully and with a smile. Follow the same tactic used in
the trial: Defend our viewpoint without making unnecessary enemies. There will be enough time
later to crush all the cockroaches together.”27 Although Castro does not specify to whom he was
referring to in this letter, it is evident through reevaluating the manifestos that he authored or
supported, that he was willing to agree with other movements simply to gain their support.

25

Like Castro, Hernández was also a graduate of the University of Havana – School of Law and dedicated to the
struggle against Batista.
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Having temporarily crushed one of his opponents, Batista tried to make his presidency
seem legitimate by calling for elections to be held in November 1954. Many people questioned
whether fair elections could be held while Batista was still in power. Grau San Martin was
running as an Auténtico and Márquez-Sterling as an Ortodoxo.28 Márquez-Sterling was an
attorney and law professor at the University of Havana that had had been the president of the
constitutional assembly which wrote the constitution of 1940. As the elections ensued, the
majority of the candidates began to drop out of the race believing that it was not being conducted
fairly, leaving Batista to win the election uncontested. Claiming to have won 47% of the votes,
on February 24, 1955 Batista assumed the presidency for a four year term.29
On May 15, 1955, Castro and the surviving Moncadistas were released from prison when
Batista granted them a general amnesty in trying to appease his detractors. One of Castro’s first
objectives was to strengthen his new movement, therefore on July 19, 1955 he merged the M-267 with Frank País and his organization, the Revolutionary National Action (ARO). Thereafter
País became the urban coordinator of the M-26-7 in Oriente Province. Castro then exiled
himself to Mexico to prepare for another attack against Batista.
Upon his arrival in Mexico on July 7, 1955, Castro had two objectives. The first was to
make sure that his men received training in guerrilla warfare, and secondly, to begin his
propaganda campaign. In order to coordinate his propaganda campaign, Castro began spreading
the message of the M-26-7 by traveling in search of financial support and men willing to join his
movement. One of the people that Castro reached out to was former Cuban President Prío

28

Hugh, Thomas. The Cuban Revolution, 1971, 74.
Bonachea, Ramón E. and Valdés, Nelson P. Revolutionary Struggle, 1947-1958. Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press,
1974, 31.
29
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Socarrás, whom Castro met in Texas in September of 1956.30Prío was very anxious to help
anyone that he believed would aid him in his attempt to return to a position of power in Cuba.
Putting aside their differences and their mutual hatred for one another, the two leaders agreed to
meet.
It was during this meeting that Prío agreed to provide money for Castro’s Granma
expedition. Nothing that Castro had written up to this point gave any indication that he would
seek power once Batista was removed; leading Prío to believe that aiding the M-26-7 would only
reinforce his own objectives. Prío gave Castro $50,000 in order to help finance his return to
Cuba. After the triumph of the insurrection, Castro referred to Prío’s grant and stated, “Pinching
$50,000 from an SOB is not theft, it’s a good deed.”31 This demonstrates that Castro simply
used Prío because he needed financial support, and did not have any intentions of repaying Prío
in any way.
With his men training for an attack on Cuba, Castro authored two programs simply
known as Manifesto No. 1 & No. 2: To the People of Cuba.32 Published on August 8, 1955,
Manifesto No. 1 was similar to History Will Absolve Me in that it outlined a program for Cuba
after the ousting of Batista. Castro also took the time to accuse Batista’s government of crimes
ranging from violence against innocent civilians to censorship of the media. In order to avoid
losing supporters, and in answering questions concerning communist ties, or even lack of
political ideology, in Manifesto No. 1, Castro made it abundantly clear that he was still an
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Ortodoxo Party member, firmly adhering to the purest principles of Chibás.33 This was also
done with the hope of retaining the support of the Ortodoxos Party in Cuba, which had disagreed
with Castro’s violent tactics in the past. Although the Ortodoxos were still putting forth an effort
to come up with a non-violent solution to Batista’s coup, with Prío’s financial aid, they had also
organized an armed faction.
For Castro, these manifestos served two main purposes; first to declare the intentions of
the M-26-7 by explaining what his movement stood for and second to inspire the people of Cuba
to support his cause rather than the other anti-Batista movements that were also gaining
popularity. Castro also tried to defend his call for an armed insurrection, opposing the various
anti-Batista organizations that were calling for a democratic solution, while also declaring to
have the most honorable armed organization with the M-26-7. Castro reinforced his points and
tried to motivate his audience by referencing the revolutionaries of Cuba’s past. In doing this, he
hoped to gain a following by talking about the nationalism that had inspired Cuban heroes such
as José Martí and Antonio Maceo. Knowing that most Cubans venerated these historical leaders,
Castro emphasized on how their ideas related to the problems that were still affecting Cuba.34
What is significant about Manifesto #2 is not Castro’s criticism of the Batista
government, but rather that it criticized all of Cuba’s previous governments. Castro declared that
since it was obvious that throughout its history Cuba’s government had been corrupt,
continuously lacking both integrity and honesty, what the Cuban people deserved was something
completely different. Castro’s call to insurrection was not meant to be seen as something
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completely new, but rather as the same struggle that Cuba’s revolutionary forefathers had also
aspired to overcome. In doing this Castro emphasized that the struggle for justice and
independence was a continuation of Martí’s struggle, suggesting that as the leader of the M-26-7
he was also an heir to Martí.
In trying to gain financial support, in Manifesto #2 Castro explained the financial
hardships that he had experienced in establishing his movement. He did however make it clear
that he is fighting for Cuba, and would never benefit personally from any funds denoted to the
movement. Declaring the severity of the situation which Cuba was facing, in Manifesto No. 2
Castro affirmed that, “Either we conquer the fatherland at any price so that we can live with
dignity and honor, or we shall remain without one.”35 The goal was a Cuba free of corruption
and Castro’s words proclaimed his seriousness.

Mexico Pact – August 30, 1956
The M-26-7 continued to train while Castro continued to pursue support for this
movement. One year after the release of Manifestos #1 and #2, and three months prior to his
return to Cuba, Castro knew that he still lacked adequate support if his return to Cuba was to
succeed. Castro had attempted to make an alliance with the DR and in doing so Castro had been
trying to negotiate a unity agreement with Echeverría, president of the University Student’s
Federation (FEU) and founder of its armed revolutionary branch, since the time that he was
released from prison. A pact with Echeverría would provide Castro with both support and
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increased recognition. Establishing accords with the M-26-7 also served the DR which hoped
that a unity agreement would expedite the ousting of Batista.
As communications between the two leaders continued, Echeverría eventually made the
trip to Mexico to visit with Castro in person in order to negotiate an agreement. The negotiations
between Castro and Echeverría were successful despite the fact that the DR was mostly an
organization that functioned independently of any other groups. Echeverría had also made an
exception by receiving aid and mutually supporting Prío and his OA, although they did not have
any type of written agreement like the pact that he had signed with Castro.36
While both men agreed to work together, they differed on the strategy needed in order to
bring down Batista. While Castro wanted a national revolution with the support of the people,
Echeverría preferred an immediate end to the conflict by attempting to assassinate (golpe arriba)
Batista thus bringing a quick end to the bloodshed. The pact stated that while Castro carried out
guerrilla warfare in the mountains, Echeverría and the DR would coordinate with the M-26-7
urban underground to promote insurrection in preparation for a general strike.
The Mexico Pact’s call for all students, workers and “worthy Cubans” to join in the
armed struggle against Batista, also benefited Castro who hoped that the Cubans would view
joining the anti-Batista movement as being their duty.37 The support of Echeverría’s DR also
gave the M-26-7 a degree of legitimacy that they had previously lacked. One of the main
reasons was that Echeverría had a good standing and reputation, whereas Castro was still
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remembered for his violence during his university years and his actions at the Moncada Barracks
attack. Although Castro’s popularity had risen after the attack on the Moncada Barracks, which
had practically made him a household name throughout the island, many still viewed him as an
adventurer or a rebel rouser, rather than a realistic alternative to Batista.38 Having a pact with an
organization that already had a following would also make recruiting for the M-26-7 an easier
process.
The meeting of these two men resulted in the signing of what simply became known as
the Mexico Pact, which they signed on August 30, 1956. The pact declared, “Both organizations
have decided to unite solidly their efforts in order to overthrow the tyranny and carry out the
Cuban Revolution.”39 As it later became evident for Castro, the signing of the pact was a union
of convenience. Castro was aware that he would need the support of the students in the cities
and large segment of the middle class, specifically in Havana. Echeverría’s DR was based in
Havana and the use of student coordinated urban terrorism to distract the military and the police
would allow Castro the time that he needed in order to organize his men in the Sierra Maestra.
The Mexico Pact does not mention Castro’s return to Cuba directly, however prior to the
drafting of the pact, Echeverría had agreed to support the Granma landing. Castro, in turn,
agreed to support future armed campaigns conducted by the DR.40 In fact the day prior to the
signing of the Mexico Pact, both men spoke in detail concerning their plans for the insurgency
and the importance of mutual support for each other’s organizations. It was during this
conversation that Castro expressed the crucial necessity of support from both Echeverría and
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País for the Granma landing. Here Echeverría agreed to conduct uprisings throughout Havana,
Matanzas, Las Villas and Camagüey provinces in order to distract the military thus allowing
Castro’s men to land safely.41The M-26-7 was beginning to organize in Havana and had leaders
such as Armando Hart and Carlos Franqui structuring cells, but at this point they were not as
organized as Echeverría’s DR. Another important benefit of agreeing to support the DR was the
fact that the university served as a safe haven which the military and police could not enter due
to the university’s autonomy.
The Granma left Mexico on November 25, 1956 expecting to arrive in Cuba just five
days later. However problems arose when the Granma became lost at sea and reached Cuba
several days later than expected, landing in Las Colorades on December 3, 1956.42 By the time
that Castro and his men arrived, the M-26-7 urban underground, led by País, had already begun
attacking police headquarters and other government buildings throughout Oriente Province. The
DR on the other hand, was left completely unaware that the landing had occurred at all. Having
agreed in Mexico to aid in the Granma landing by causing distractions in Havana, the DR
clashed with the police and several of the students were arrested, and Echeverría was beaten up
by police officers during the confrontation.43 Since the date of the landing was changed,
unbeknownst to Echeverría, when the Granma actually arrived, the DR did not carry out any
actions to distract the government.
Regardless of the events, Castro alleged that Echeverría’s purposely withheld support
contrary to the agreement in the Mexico Pact. Once in the safety of the Sierra Maestra, Castro
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would write a letter to Echeverría declaring that the failure of the DR to act during the Granma
landing was treason, stating “Especially you, José Antonio, who promised me you would join in
the uprising.” This letter demonstrated a major rift between the two groups, which already
lacked trust in one another. In response, Echeverría proclaimed that no member of the DR
should ever join the M-26-7 rebels in the mountains and Castro would later pay back the DR by
refusing to aid their assault on the Presidential Palace.44 Both Castro and Echeverría would
continue to communicate, both claiming that they shared the same goal in bringing a swift end to
the Batista regime, however they continued to distrust one another and neither retained any
confidence of mutual support. In a letter sent to the press informing them of the departure of the
Granma from Mexico, Castro once again declared what he had been proclaiming for several
months, “In 1956 we shall be free or we shall be martyrs.”45

Attack on the Presidential Palace - March 13, 1957
Just four months after Castro’s return to Cuba, his rebel group consisted of a core of
approximately fifteen survivors of the Granma landing, which were now relatively safe in the
Sierra Maestra. It is at this point that Echeverría demonstrated that he fully intended to follow
through with the plans he had discussed during the signing of the Mexico Pact. Unlike Castro,
who was calling for support for the armed insurrection against the military and police,
Echeverría continued to support the idea of golpe arriba, or hitting at the top. Echeverría
believed that this approach would put a quick end to the violence and allow for the installation of
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a provisional government until fair elections could be held. This was something that Castro
wanted to avoid, therefore although the DR had invited the M-26-7 and Prío’s AO to participate
in the attack; the M-26-7 did not respond to the request.46
Castro was well hidden in the Sierra Maestra and therefore no longer had any reason to
support the DR’s efforts against Batista. Instead, Castro was making plans in case the
assassination of Batista was successful. The claims at unity seem unrealistic when behind the
scenes Castro was preparing to contest the DR’s agenda should they succeed in assassinating
Batista. In fact the threat that Batista would be defeated quickly worried Castro so much that he
went back on what he had agreed to in the Mexico Pact, by preparing to install a provisional
president within the Sierra Maestra in case the DR’s attack succeeded.47
Although they had not organized definitive plans, to Echeverría the attack on the
Presidential Palace was derived as a direct result of the agreement that he had made with Castro
in Mexico, an agreement which Echeverría planned on fulfilling as he organized his assault on
the palace. Prior to the attack Echeverría had written, “Our commitment to the people of Cuba
was determined in the Mexico Pact… we believe that the time has come to fulfill that
commitment.”48 The attack quickly took a turn for the worst when, without any reinforcements,
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the DR rebels found themselves trapped inside the palace, with Batista safely hidden away on the
top floor.49
Rather than aid the DR, whose men were being gunned down, Castro’s and Pazos were
more concerned with getting Herbert Matthews into the Sierra Maestra to interview Castro.
Several members of the M-26-7 urban underground did conveniently show up at the palace after
the assassination attempt had ended and most of the DR attackers had already been killed.
Instead of aiding of the DR, the M-26-7 appeared suddenly, and fled just as quickly, having
commandeered one of the DR’s vans full of weapons.50 Although the DR would demand that the
weapons be returned to them, the demands were ignored with the only response being a message
to the media from Castro condemning the actions as “useless bloodshed.”51 But the fact remains
that members of the M-26-7 were close enough to the scene of the attack that they were able to
steal a van, without being spotted by the military or the police, and quickly disappearing. It is
obvious that the same rebels that stole the van could have reinforced the DR during the battle at
the palace, but they did not and that resulted in the death of one of the anti-Batista movement’s
most respected and capable leaders and forty of his followers.52
The DR lost not only Echeverría on that day, but almost all of the top leadership of the
DR were killed, along with several OA militants as well, thus changing the circumstances of the
DR from that moment forward. Although the student movement continued, after the failure of
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the palace attack, no one in the DR would be able to compete with Castro’s popularity and
power. One of the major consequences of the death of Echeverría was the split in the DR
leadership which would eventually create two separate guerrilla groups in the Escambray
Mountains, a topic which will be discussed later.
Continuously trying to return to power, it is also important to note Prío’s immediate
support to another guerrilla expedition. By and large Castro had been ignoring much of Prío’s
suggestions, and it should have been obvious to Prío at this point that Castro was not as desperate
for his aid as he had been in Mexico. In addition, Castro’s reputation as a leader in the
insurrection was growing steadily and that unquestionably caused Prío much concern since it
hindered his own aspirations to return to Cuba as president. Prío also created the Organización
Auténtica, which was the radical faction of the party, willing to use guerrilla warfare as a method
to defeating Batista.
In May 1957, Prío’s OA began the Corinthia expedition, under the leadership of Calixto
Sánchez, with the hopes of opening a second guerilla front in Sierra Cristal.53 Almost as soon as
the Corinthia landed in Cuba, its men were attacked by the military. A brief gunfight ensued and
eventually the majority of the group was forced to surrender. While some of the men died in the
battle, shortly afterward most of the survivors were captured men, including Sánchez, and they
were executed by the military.54
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Castro’s competition was getting smaller, especially considering that at this point the M26-7 appeared to be the only insurgent force on the island strong enough to overthrow Batista.
This could be the reason that after the death of Echeverría, the M-26-7 stepped up their assaults,
not only in the Sierra Maestra, but also targeting the sugar cane fields in the plains and Cuban
industry in the cities. Castro wanted to capitalize on Echeverría’s death by increasing his own
visibility and showing off the strength of the M-26-7.
In response to the rise in violence throughout Cuba, five opposition leaders came together
in June 1957 and published what they called the Manifesto of the Five. This manifesto called for
national unity, a return to the laws of the 1940 Constitution, fair elections, and an end to the
violence, declaring that peace was the responsibility of both the government and the
citizens.55The assertion that the citizens of Cuba were also responsible for peace was a direct
charge at the violent actions of the opposition groups such as the M-26-7, DR, and Prío. The
Manifesto of the Five was signed by Millo Ochoa of the Ortodoxos, Carlos Márquez Sterling of
Ortodoxia Libre [OL was the electoral faction of the Ortodoxos], José Pardo Llada of
Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, Porfiro Pendás of Defensa de la Contitución and
Amalio Fiallo of Movimiento de Liberación.
The manifesto specifically warned that a continuation of the violence that was currently
plaguing Cuba would result in the island losing itself to “a totalitarian dictatorship, and blind and
bloody revenges.”56 The main purpose of the manifesto was to urge the Cuban people to seek a
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political solution through negotiations, specifically calling on Batista to step down, in order for
the violence plaguing the country to end. By repudiating both the regime and the opposition
groups, the signers of the manifesto urged Cubans to demand elections. None of the groups that
signed the manifesto were members of any of Prío’s organizations, and all of them vehemently
denounced his financing of guerrilla groups. Although the SAR group had previously failed in
their attempt at achieving a non-violent solution, signers of the Manifesto of the Five believed
that the increasing violence could pressure Batista into stepping down.57 The manifesto was
ultimately ignored and rather than stepping down, Batista, in an attempt to appease his critics and
mounting pressure from the United States, announced that elections would be held in 1958.
Castro continued to oppose elections and therefore felt the need to respond to the
Manifesto of the Five, as well as to Batista’s announcement of new elections while Batista was
in power. Castro responded with his Manifesto of the Sierra Maestra. According to U.S.
Ambassador Smith, he responded to the call for elections by stating that anyone caught voting
would be in danger of either imprisonment or death at the hands of the M-26-7.58 Castro was no
longer a politician, but had evolved into a guerrilla leader.
The importance of the urban underground cannot be overlooked, as the M-26-7 in the
Sierra Maestra needed their assistance in order to survive life in the mountains. Castro however
desired more than resources from the urban underground, he hoped to control them in order to
make his guerrillas the main focus of the insurrection. Now that he was a guerrilla leader, his
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next objective was to subordinate the urban underground as well as the remaining anti-Batista
groups under his control. Cuba was in a political crisis, and many groups tried to work together
to solve the problems facing the island, but the fact is that sectarian rivalries existed, which
meant that the groups were not only dealing with the Batista government, but oftentimes
quarrelling amongst themselves. Castro’s next step would be to try to make sure that when the
fighting was over, he would be on top. In doing this, he knew that he would have to coordinate
with other organizations, while increasing his own force.
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CHAPTER 2: TAKING CONTROL OF THE M-26-7
By mid-1957 Castro had demonstrated that he and his guerrilla group could endure the
circumstances in the Sierra Maestra. For Castro and his group, the Sierra Maestra was a safe
haven where they could wait out the many dangers that of the insurrection. As 1957 progressed,
Castro found himself having to deal with the remaining challengers to his quest for political
power, as well as the small minority of groups that still hoped to end the violence through
democratic means. As we shall see, from early June 1957 through mid-1958 Castro successfully
maintained control of M-26-7 urban underground after the death of País and he took advantage
of the divisions within the other anti-Batista groups in order to make the M-26-7 appear like a
viable force.

The Manifesto of the Sierra Maestra (MSM) – July 12, 1957
Castro responded to the Manifesto of the Five in his own declaration, the MSM, which
was published on July 12, 1957.59 This manifesto was co-signed by Felipe Pazos and Raúl
Chibás, who were almost certainly invited to sign the manifesto since Castro considered it
necessary to convey the message that the M-26-7 was democratic and focused on returning Cuba
to the constitution of 1940.60 Both Pazos and Chibás were well respected so their inclusion also
gave Castro some credibility in his attempt to legitimize his movement.
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Pazos and Chibás each represented Cuba’s main political parties and they were both wellknown and well respected.61 Their reputations added credibility to the manifesto’s avocation to
all political parties and civic organizations to oppose an electoral solution and refuse political
compromise with Batista under any circumstances. Similar to all the other manifestos, the MSM
included a call for unification amongst the opposition forces. The manifesto states, “Unity is
now the only patriotic way. Unity is what all political, revolutionary, and social sectors that
combated the dictatorship had in common.”62
It is ironic that while the MSM called for the unification of the opposition forces, it
implies within the text that it referred to unity under the condition that the leader of the united
opposition groups would be Castro.63 The MSM called for unity in what Guevara called “the
establishment of a great civic revolutionary front comprising all opposition parties, all civic
institutions and all revolutionary forces.” In his war journal Guevara wrote that the attempt at
unity was not successful since “…the enemy broke the pact expressed in the manifesto when
they refused to acknowledge the authority of the Sierra.”64 When Guevara speaks of “the
enemy” he is specifically referring to Pazos and Chibás, who by signing the Miami Pact, clearly
went against Castro’s mandates in the MSM. Fidel and Raúl Castro and Guevara would criticize
Pazos for signing the Miami Pact and Chibás for taking part and supporting the pact.
The MSM called upon the people of Cuba to join the struggle against Batista, while
declaring the goals and demands of the M-26-7. The most important demand was for the
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immediate resignation of Batista followed by a call for fair elections. Castro had been very
outspoken against elections being held since the time that Batista had taken power, nonetheless
in the MSM he declared that the rebels had wanted elections since they had been denied to Cuba
on March 10, the day of Batista’s coup. Castro, in a carefully devised statement proclaimed,
“We are here because we want them [elections] more than anyone else.” “Can there be free,
democratic, and impartial elections under a tyranny which represents anti-democracy and
partiality?”65
Since most of the political parties had pushed for elections, Castro had to take advantage
of the commonly held notion that fair elections could not be held under Batista for one simple
reason. If the opposition groups would have agreed to elections, under the direction of an
impartial mediation, there would no longer be any reason for a rebellion against the government
and the M-26-7 would no longer need to exist. Castro needed the insurrection to continue since
it was his vehicle to power, and with his reputation steadily increasing both in and out of Cuba,
Castro simply had to continue to promise fair elections. This was especially true since Castro
had repeatedly stated that he did not want to be part of the new leadership that would replace
Batista. It is for this reason that in many instances where Batista agreed to schedule elections,
the M-26-7 would increase acts of terrorism throughout the urban centers in order to encourage
Batista to suspend constitution rights and cancel the elections.66 Camilo Cienfuegos stated in his
war journals that Castro had made a “no-election degree” which declared that “any political
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agent who dedicates himself to the corrupt system of collection voting cards will be tried by a
summary court martial and executed on the spot.”67
The MSM made it clear that the rebellion would continue until Batista was defeated. He
also declared that the M-26-7 would not allow a military junta to take power by insisting that it
would only prolong the insurrection. Although Castro did not have the authority to name Cuba’s
next president, he took it upon himself to name Manuel Urrutia Lleó as the provisional president
once power was taken away from the Batista government. By choosing a provisional president,
Castro was giving himself authority that others did not feel he possessed, thus causing
disagreements that would continue for several months.68
The MSM attempted to win over the Cuban population by promising a return to
constitutional normalcy. Revisiting the ideas of History Will Absolve Me, Castro affirmed that
the Cuban people would benefit greatly from social reform, such as a campaign to end illiteracy
on the island, and an end to corporate corruption with the introduction of agrarian reform laws to
protect those living in the rural areas. Many of the social programs that Castro promised in the
MSM spoke directly to the peasants of Oriente province. The rural population had aided Castro
and his men since the Granma landing, and the majority of them had remained his main
supporters, hence Castro wanted to make it clear that he would not forget to support their needs
as well.
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It is important however, to mention that the MSM was also a response to a letter written
by País to Castro on July 7, 1957 just seven days prior to the Manifesto being made public. The
letter is important in that it represents País’ intentions for the M-26-7 as the insurrection went
forward. Perhaps due to concern of Castro’s inclinations towards sole leadership of the M-26-7,
in his letter, País explains to Castro that it was time to develop a “new tactic” since there was no
“revolutionary program” in place.69 País expressed the need to do away with so many leaders,
without concentrating the movement under one person. País stated in his letter that “the national
leadership will also be composed by the six provincial coordinators.70 País felt that since the
Movement had grown so large, with the Sierra Maestra rebels as a small portion of a bigger
organization, it was time to coordinate everyone’s responsibility, based on rank and regions of
operations.71
The letter must have astonished Castro, who did not want to compete with País, but rather
wanted País and the urban underground to be subordinate to him and his guerrillas.72 Making
matters more alarming for Castro, País decided to create a national directorate, made-up of
thirteen members and Castro’s guerrilla group would have only one delegate. To Castro this was
unacceptable. At this point Castro knew that he would have to consolidate his power base in
order to not lose control, while País, on the other hand, was trying to transition the M-26-7 into a
civilian movement where every delegate would have limited control. Rolando E. Bonachea, a
former member of the DR underground, who has written many works on the Cuban insurrection
believes that País’ attempts to make changes to the power structure of the M-26-7 is one of the

69

Alvarez, José. Frank País: Architect of Cuba’s Betrayed Revolution. Baca Raton: Universal Publishers, 2009, 206.
Alvarez, José. Frank País, 206.
71
Bonachea, Ramón and Valdés, Nelson. Revolutionary Struggle, 1947-1958, 98.
72
Alvarez, José. Frank País, 210.
70

32

main reasons that Castro reached out to Pazos and Chibás to co-sign the MSM.73 The MSM was
made public on July 12, 1957, only five days after the letter from País was delivered, and
eighteen days later, País would be shot dead by the Santiago police after a massive hunt was
orchestrated by the Chief of Police, Colonel Rafael Salas Cañizares.

The Death and Replacement of Frank Pais - July 30, 1957
At this point País was the only insurrectionary left that could compete with Castro for the
leadership of the M-26-7 and his letter to Castro clearly shows that he wanted the movement to
be coordinated in a more democratic fashion, as well as wanting the rebel army to be subordinate
to the underground civilian leadership. It is well known that the Sierra depended on the llano for
everything from food, medicine, and clothes, to its arms and ammunition. The guerrillas of the
Sierra Maestra could not have survived, had it not been for the continuous support from the
urban underground.74
A review of the communication between the llano and the Sierra Maestra shows that
there had been a high level of tensions between the guerrillas and the urban underground from
very early on in the insurrection. Evidence of this is found in Guevara’s diaries from May 1957,
where he predicted the conflicts between the sierra and the llano. Here Guevara states,
“Practically speaking, they were two separate groups, with different tactics and different
strategies. The deep rift which in later months would endanger the unity of the Movement had
not yet appeared, but we could already see that our concepts were different.”75
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Although the urban underground was constantly in danger of attacks from the military or
police, Castro wanted the public to believe that a major revolution was taking place in the
mountains. Nonetheless, it is quite obvious that the M-26-7 guerrilla leadership, such as the
Castro brothers and Guevara distrusted the urban underground since they viewed them as
competitors for control of their organization, and they let it be known throughout their
communications. Guevara was correct in stating that their “concepts were different,” since País
was trying to combat Batista’s forces in the cities, while Castro was calling for weapons and
ammunition to be given to the mountain rebels. With País and his followers in greater danger,
disputes with the Sierra Maestra increased as Castro demanded supplies that could be put to
better use in the cities.76
By this point in the struggle, País had gained a great deal of popularity was the face of the
Anti-Batista movement in Oriente, not Castro. Adding to this, the fact that País was not afraid to
be argumentative or confrontational with Castro over the way in which the revolution should be
run, he was becoming a hindrance to Castro’s plan for total control. Guevara’s diaries go as far
as speaking extremely negatively of the urban fighters, while commending the rebels of the
Sierra Maestra. History, however paints a different picture, since it was the rebels in the cities
that risked their lives almost daily, and in a letter to Castro, País even jokingly mentions that he
wanted “to rest” in the Sierra Maestra since it was getting too dangerous in the llano.77 So while
it verges on being a conspiracy theory, the alleged involvement of Castro and his loyalists in the
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death of País warrants further investigation and it is my belief that in sending a letter to Castro
concerning the leadership of the movement, País was in fact writing his own death sentence.
The speculation about the connection between Castro and the death of País lies in the
involvement of Vilma Espín. Espín was a Castro loyalist that had collaborated with Castro since
the attack on the Moncada Barracks, had served as a messenger between the sierra and the llano
and was known to be Raúl Castro’s lover. Speaking on the death of País, Ramón Bonachea and
Nelson Valdés stated, “An informer had told the police where he was hiding. His death brought
about an internal crisis with the 26th of July, but one of Fidel’s pressing problems was over.”78 A
former rebel fighter and author of several books on the topic of the Cuban insurrection, Lucas
Morán Arce has some fascinating comments on the subject. Although Morán does not openly
claim that it was Espín that had betrayed País, he does mention that Espín was one of a very
small group of people that knew where País was hiding.79 Morán goes on to say that Enrique
Canto Bory mentions in his autobiography that País had asked him not to tell anyone of his
location, ‘especially Vilma Espín.’80 This clearly points to the fact that País himself was leery of
Espín’s intentions. Morán also mentions that País’ own brother, Agustín was convinced that it
was Espín that had betrayed País by informing the police on his whereabouts.81 The Cuban
magazine Bohemia reported that País had been moving from house to house trying to hide from
police Captain Salas Cañizares who was conducting random checks of houses. The fact that
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Cañizares’s found País in the very first house that he checked seems to be more than just a
coincidence in light of the aforementioned information.82
Another account of the events comes from Armando Hart, who had been one of the M26-7’s earliest militants, and an important leader within the urban revolutionary underground in
Havana. Having firsthand knowledge of the events, Hart mentions in his memoir, Aldabonazo,
that in Espín’s own account she had stated that “When I called him [País] later, he was no longer
at home and he did not call me, nor did he call the following day – much to my surprise because
he used to call as soon as he changed houses so that we could be in contact with him.”83 If País
had in fact told Canto not to mention his whereabouts to anyone, specifically naming Espín, and
he had not called Espín, as she claims that he normally would, perhaps he was beginning to view
Espín as a threat to his security.
It must also be mentioned that after the death of País, the sierra immediately began to
dominate the movement with the hopes of ending any previous animosity that had existed
between the sierra and the llano by making Castro the sole leaders of both. Two of Castro’s
closest allies were given positions of power with the urban underground with Espín being named
chief of organization for Oriente, while Celia Sánchez became the M-26-7 urban underground’s
official liaison with the Sierra Maestra.
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It is evident in the writings of both Castro and Guevara, concerning the uproar in Oriente
over the death of País that they had planned to use the circumstances to their advantage.84
Lamenting País’ death was done openly within a public sphere, but behind closed doors the
conversation turned to power politics. An example of this is seen in a letter from Guevara to
Castro concerning the urban underground. Guevara mentions himself, and even Raúl Castro as
possible replacements for País.85 The urban underground, with País in charge, seemed to
Guevara to be obstacle, rather than an ally.
Guevara had clearly been at odds with País and he used the events of his death and his
prestige as momentum to increase the guerrilla’s popularity. Guevara states in his diary, “When
Frank País was murdered, we lost one of our most valuable fighters, but the people’s reaction to
the crime showed that additional forces were joining the struggle and the people’s fighting spirit
had increased.”86 Clearly País’ death influenced many civilians that were tiring of being victims
of military violence. This allowed both Guevara and Castro to use the death of the beloved País
as an opportunity to insist that the people of Cuba support their movement and join the
insurrection.
Castro initially made his ideas on the death of País known through a speech on Radio
Rebelde, the underground radio station in the mountains.87 The government’s constant
restrictions of media outlets allowed Radio Rebelde to become a major source of information to
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a Cuban population that was interested in receiving regular updates on the major events of the
insurrection.88 Castro stated on Radio Rebelde, “After seeing the assassination of Frank País, the
most courageous, useful, and extraordinary of all our fighters, what is holding back thousands of
Cubans anxious to do something?”89 Castro needed to emphasize the idea that the guerrilla
forces in the Sierra Maestra were the “vanguard” of the revolution, reinforcing the notion that the
urban underground subservient to the sierra.90
País was murdered and the leadership of the urban underground was replaced by Castro
supporters, allowing him to take absolute control of the M-26-7. Even some supporters of País,
such as Lester Rodríguez, reluctantly began to participate in Castro’s movement without being
fully aware of his agenda. Other members of the urban underground, such as Faustino Pérez
(physician), Armando Hart (lawyer), Enrique Oltuski (engineer) and Carlos Franqui (journalist)
began to work more directly with the rural guerrillas after the death of País.91
Castro’s fight for weapons came to end and with his loyalists controlling the urban
centers he immediately demanded that the weapons he desired be sent to the sierra. In a letter to
Celia Sánchez, dated August 11, 1957, less than two weeks after the death of País, Castro
demands, “All guns, all bullets, and all supplies to the Sierra!”92 Just three days later, in a
second letter to Celia Sánchez, Castro declared, “I insist, as I did in my previous letter, that a
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directive must be given to the Movement right now concerning the war: All weapons, all bullets,
and all resources are for the Sierra.” Castro continues, “Finally, you know that with Frank gone,
we’ll have to be more directly involved in the work that he carried on so brilliantly.”93With
Castro’s rebel army firmly established, one of his main goals was to make the Sierra Maestra the
base of operations for his struggle, which required desperately needed weapons that País thought
would better serve the urban underground. This would enable the M-26-7 to make preparations
to come down from the mountains to instigate attacks in order to spread the insurrection from
Oriente through to Havana.
Another example in which the M-26-7 guerrillas in mountains were taking advantage of
the death of País can be found by once again examining the diaries of Guevara. While
mentioning the role of the Sierra Maestra, Guevara states, “The Sierra Maestra is an
indestructible bulwark of freedom. It is part of the hearts of our people and it is here that we will
know how to do justice to the faith and confidence of our people. The words ‘we will know
how’ meant that Fidel and only Fidel knew how.”94 Castro knew that something had to be done
in order for the M-26-7 to focus on the guerrillas in the Sierra Maestra.95 Guevara makes it clear
that “only Fidel knew how,” thus amply implying that no one else would know, or be capable of
bringing an end to the struggle. It is also clear in his statement that those in the Sierra Maestra
were faithful only to Castro and would only adhere to his commands and no one else had
authority to override his strategies as any non-followers were expunged from the core leadership.
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Miami Pact – November, 1957 – The Unity Pact
Castro consolidated his leadership to encompass the forces of both the sierra and the
llano, an outcome that País was trying to avoid. During this time, several leading members of
the exile community were discussing plans of organizing to oust Batista, by unifying the
opposition and coordinating armed action against the regime. After several weeks of
negotiations an agreement known as the Miami Pact was announced by several opposition
groups calling themselves the Cuban Liberation Council, (Junta de Liberación Cubana).96 The
Miami Pact intended to form a provisional government and pronounce a provisional president
that would direct the country until fair elections could be held. Being that Prío was the main
organizer of the Cuban Liberation Council, which was made up of mostly moderates and some
left of center members, once again the PSP was not invited to participate.
Felipe Pazos and Léster Rodríguez signed on behalf of the M-26-7, and Castro rebuked
them immediately, claiming that they did not have the authority to represent the movement nor to
sign any unity agreements without the direct approval of Castro himself. Whether or not Castro
had authorized these men to represent the M-26-7 in Miami remains unclear, but his bitterness
towards the Cuban Liberation Council is very well documented. In criticizing the Miami Pact,
Castro claimed that although it called itself a unity pact, it was actually an attempt by Prío to take
over the opposition forces in order to return himself to power.
Castro’s commanders also spoke out against the Miami Pact. Raúl Castro called the pact
“a trap of politiquería” which he stated was confirmed by “the simple fact that while leaders of
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the organizations signing the agreement are abroad carrying out an imaginary revolution, the
leaders of the 26th of July are in Cuba making a real revolution.”97 Guevara went even further by
accusing Pazos and Rodríguez of treason.98 Speaking on the signing of the Miami Pact by Pazos,
Guevara stated that, “He appointed himself delegate of the M-26-7 in Miami, and he was on the
verge of being appointed interim president of the Republic. Through this maneuver, Prío made
sure the he had a faithful man leading the provisional government.”99
The M-26-7 was in constant contact with Llerena, the Chairman of the US-based July
26th Movement Committee in Exile. One day prior to the release of the Miami Pact, in a letter to
Llerena, Castro had stated, “Politiquería has done much harm in Cuba and will do so again
outside of Cuba.100 But we have succeeded in sending politiquería into exile, and that is at least
one step forward.”101 By labeling other opposition groups as the same politiquería that Cuba had
endured for decades, Castro was able to gain the support from Cubans that wanted to see an end
to the political corruption and had high hopes for a more democratic Cuba. Since the Miami Pact
clearly went against the MSM, specifically in naming a different provisional president than the
one that Castro had chosen in Urrutia, Castro was compelled to reply. In condemning the Miami
Pact, Castro also stated that if a provisional government was named, after the fall of Batista
without his approval, the M-26-7 would continue “its struggle for liberation.”102
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Also detrimental to Castro’s hopes for power, the Miami Pact states that the M-26-7
rebels would be incorporated into the Cuban army. In response to this Castro stated, “the 26th of
July Movement claims for itself the function of maintaining public order and reorganizing the
armed forces of the Republic.”103 As we shall see, by reorganizing the armed forces, what
Castro meant was that the military would become subordinate to the M-26-7. Also, due to the
fact that the M-26-7 was the strongest insurrectional force on the island numbering several
hundred men, Castro claimed that he was in fact the leader of both the political and military roles
of the opposition forces.104
Supporting the idea that Castro was the insurrection’s true leader, Hart stated, “We
thought that the public formulation of our reputation should be made by Fidel” thus justifying
Castro’s disgruntled response towards the ideas of the Miami Pact.105 Guevara would add, “We
must emphasize that the enemy broke the pact expressed in the manifesto when they refused to
acknowledge the authority of the Sierra Maestra and made an attempt to shackle the future
revolutionary government.”106 Here Guevara is referring to Pazos, labeling him as “the enemy”
and solidifying his claims that the Miami Pact was only an attempt by Prío to return to power.
After refuting the exiles in Miami, Castro had to concern himself with the other guerrilla groups
that were in fact making real revolution in Cuba, the splintered guerrilla groups of the DR.
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Escambra y Guerrillas
After the death of Echeverría, the few remaining leaders of the DR had gone into exile in
order to reorganize and prepare for guerrilla operations under the direction of Faure
Chomón.107A short time later the DR leadership found that they could not overcome their
differences over strategy and leadership and this caused them to split into two separate and
opposing groups. One group under the direction of Chomón, had decided to continue with
Echeverría’s strategy of attacking at the top, and planned on moving the group to Havana in
order to organize another assassination plot. Chomón and his men left the mountains and offered
the M-26-7 a cache of weapons in return for representation in the leadership of the struggle.
Castro was not willing to share the leadership of the movement and Chomón’s offer of weapons
was simply ignored.108
The other group, led by Eloy Gutiérrez Menoyo and Armando Fleites, which had been
influenced by Castro’s successes in the Sierra Maestra, decided to continue guerrilla warfare in
the Escambray Mountains. By the end of 1958, Menoyo and Fleites had released the Manifesto
of the Escambray, pronouncing the establishment of their own guerrilla unit, the Second Front of
the Escambray which was numbering approximately one thousand men.109 The new front was a
direct challenge to Castro’s claim of guerrilla dominance on the island. Two of the reasons that
it posed a threat was because their base of operations was in Las Villas province, which is
approximately 180 miles from Havana, whereas Castro’s base in Oriente was more than twice
that distance. Castro feared that should Batista fall suddenly, Menoyo and Fleites’s guerrillas

107

Suchlicki, Jamie. University Students and Revolution in Cuba, 1920-1968. University of Miami Press, 1969, 84.
Sweig, Julia. Inside the Cuban Revolution, 130.
109
Suchlicki, Jamie. University Students and Revolution in Cuba, 86.
108

43

would be able to reach Havana faster than the M-26-7. The second reason was that they were
being funded by Prío, a man that Castro saw as his competition for power. Understanding the
popularity and visibility of the Escambray guerrillas, Castro knew that they would have to be
dealt with promptly in order to avoid competition once Batista was defeated. The animosity that
the two groups held for each other became more obvious as Castro and his men prepared for the
national strike.

The Total War Against the Tyranny Manifesto – March 12, 1958
On March 12, 1958 Castro released the Total War against Tyranny Manifesto. This
manifesto was released a mere four weeks before the declaration of the general strike, and it
called on the Cuban military and the students to support a national strike.110 The Manifesto also
affirmed that the strike would be backed by armed support from Castro’s rebels, yet as the
evidence shows, that this was not the case. Although Castro spoke about the strike as if it were
intended to be one of the final steps in removing Batista from power, the events of April 9, 1958,
turned out to be a complete failure. Julia Sweig, author of Inside the Cuban Revolution
maintains that the failure of the strike was not what Castro had intended, yet she fails to provide
evidence and the events that unfolded tell a different story. While Sweig claims that the urban
underground were making decisions concerning the details of the strike, the evidence proves that
the opposite was the case, and that the major decisions were coming from the Sierra Maestra.111
She also claims that Eusebio Mujal, of the Confederations of Cuban Workers (CTC) was
involved in the planning of the strike, yet there is no evidence to support that claim, and even
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Castro expected that the CTC would not assist in the strike precisely because the pro-Batista
Mujal was forbidding it.112 The PSP had intentions to participate, however the urban
underground rejected their request to participate.113
The call to strike was announced at the last moment, with the general public completely
unaware of the date or time when it was supposed to take place. The announcement was made at
11:00 am, a time when the workers generally would not be listening to the radio.114 Since the
idea for a general strike had been talked about since Castro’s time in Mexico, one is led to
believe that a person as meticulous to detail as Castro would have been more organized. The fact
that the strike was not better organized and that Castro made such a pathetic effort at announcing
an event that was deemed so critical since the very beginning of the insurrection, is strong
evidence that the strike had been orchestrated to fail.
According to the US Ambassador Smith, as soon as the DR became aware that a strike
was being coordinated, they contacted Castro to inform him that once the strike was successful
they would be appointing a new Mayor, Chief of Police and other government appointments in
Havana.115 Castro’s response to the DR was a letter stating that no one had the authority to make
any government appointments other than him. Upon hearing this, the DR made it clear that if
they were not involved in the process of making political appointments, they would not support

112

Sweig, Julia. Inside the Cuban Revolution, 52.
Thomas, Hugh. The Cuban Revolution, 206-207.
114
Radio Rebelde broadcast on April 9, 1958. Broadcast Transcripts of Radio Rebelde, July 1957 – Dec. 1958.
(Microfilm collection), Princeton University Library, Microfilm 06154, Box 8-9 of C. Franqui Collection.
“Huelga, huelga, huelga. Todos a la Huelga. Todos a la calle, Pueblo de Cuba: ya sonó la hora.” The call to strike
was announced for several consecutive days.
115
Smith, Earl E.T. The Fourth Floor: An Account of the Castro Communist Revolution. New York: Random House,
1962, 105.
113

45

the strike. Ambassador Smith also stated, “If Castro had been willing to let the Directorio
Revolucionario name the Mayor and other officials in the city, they would have actively cooperated and the results might have been different.”116 As it was, Castro ignored the opportunity
to receive aid from the DR, in light of the fact that they had a great presence in the cities and was
offering support.
Castro was aware that in order for the strike to succeed, the M-26-7 needed support from
the unions and the communists.117 Prior to announcing the strike, Castro knew that the students
and the labor movements would not strike.118 On March 28 Castro wrote a statement from the
Sierra Maestra stating that all opposition groups, including the Communists should support the
strike and his statement was ultimately ignored.119 It is also suspicious is that although the
general public was uninformed about the events surrounding the strike, Batista and his men were
aware that it was taking place on April 9. Ray Brennan, a journalist for the Chicago Sun-Times,
who an eye-witness to the events, acknowledged that “Reports on the scene agreed later that the
Batista government probably had advance information.”120 It is probable that Batista was aware
of the call to strike due to the overwhelming amount of police officers and military soldiers that
he had on the scene on the day of the strike had been set.121 The general strike was supposed to
be organized clandestinely and only a handful of Castro’s supporters were aware of the details,
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yet Batista’s soldiers were well prepared.122 Castro’s men were the only ones that had any
precise knowledge of the date and time that the strike would be called.
Subsequently when the strike occurred, the armed resistance never materialized. Castro
himself stated in the Total War against the Tyranny Manifesto that not only would armed support
be available, but also that “Armed action will be charged to the rebel forces, the militias of the
26th of July Movement…”123 Here Castro was very clear, yet neither of these factions backed
the strike. Neither Castro nor anyone from the rebel forces took the blame for the failure of the
strike and in the end only two people were blamed, Faustino Pérez and David Salvador.
When Argentine journalist Jorge Ricardo Masetti interviewed Pérez on the subject of the
failed strike, Pérez stated, “…for the most part, the majority of the rebels did not have
confidence in its success.”124 Pérez makes it clear that when he referred to “the majority of the
rebels” he specifically meant those in the highest positions. Add to this the fact that after the
failure of the strike, in an interview with Brennan, Castro stated, “The revolution will only be
won when we defeat the Batista army in combat.”125 Here Castro is once again making the point
that the only way to defeat Batista is to support the insurgency. At the same time Castro is
taking no responsibility for the outcome of the strike, but rather turning the events to his favor.
According to Urrutia, the strike occurred at a time when the rebel army was stronger than the
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urban underground.126 In the end, what the general strike did was put an end to the conflict
between the urban underground and the rural guerrillas, allowing Castro to take power away
from the llano and concentrating all efforts towards his guerrilla army. Castro made this clear in
a meeting he held at los Altos de Mompié.

Mompié Meeting – May 3, 1958
On May 3, 1958 Castro organized a meeting at a peasant’s hut in the area known as los
Altos de Mompié, under the guise of having to discuss the consequences of the failure of the
general strike. In actuality, what came to be known as the Mompié meeting was for Castro, a
major step in ensuring that the opposition forces would become subordinate to the M-26-7, thus
taking steps at becoming the supreme leader of the anti-Batista movement. At this point it was
no longer important if members of other groups were not willing to unite with the M-26-7, since
most of them had either been eliminated, or had lost any type of significant power. At Mompié
Castro made it clear that if the struggle were to continue and ultimately succeed, it would only be
under his leadership.
Luis Buch, a leading member of the urban underground and soon to be appointed head of
public relation in Caracas, stated that the main argument made at the Mompié meeting, was,
“…to unify the July 26 Movement under a single leadership exercised by an executive
committee located in the Sierra, and whose general secretary would be Fidel.”127 This also
allowed Castro to shift focus from cities such as Havana and Santiago, which lost much of their
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impact after the failed strike, to the M-26-7 headquarters in the Sierra Maestra. At the meeting,
Castro was named General Secretary of the Executive Committee and the M-26-7 had
successfully presented itself as the largest and most powerful force remaining, and the only
group that remained that was capable of removing Batista from power. It is interesting to note
that the majority of those participating in the meeting were either some of Castro’s most faithful
supporters, or opposition members that had become subordinate to his authority.128Since Castro
strategically surrounded himself strictly with people that were loyalists, no one at the Mompié
meeting contested his leadership, which allowed him to effectively replace all the leaders in the
major cities with members from the M-26-7 from the Sierra Maestra, making sure that the
movement was now completely under his command.129
The strike and how quickly it was put down allowed Castro to successfully strengthen his
position and overshadow those of the other opposition groups. The increase in violence by the
police, during and after the strike, also helped Castro as the rise in sympathy for the many young
people that became victims to the strike’s aftermath. This allowed Castro to oppose a democratic
solution by continuing to place blame on the government for the violence and he warned the
Cuban citizens of what would happen if the country was to once again be run by the same old
politicians that had brought it to this point.130Also, by blaming the strike’s failure on Pérez and
Salvador, Castro discreetly removed any blame from the M-26-7. With the blame clearly placed
on someone else, Castro never felt the need to explain his misguided call for a national strike.
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He also fails to mention that although the Total War against the Tyranny Manifesto stated that
the guerrillas would support the strike; they did not help at all.131
The Mompié meeting had turned out to be a cleansing of leadership. After the meeting
Castro sent Haydée Santamaria to the United States to take charge of the M-26-7 abroad.132On
August 1958, just three months after Santamaria’s arrival in Miami, fully aware that he had lost
all authority to Santamaria, Llerena resigned from his position.133Castro’s sending of Santamaria
abroad was a strategic power move which allowed him to use a loyal supporter in order to
safeguard control of the movement in exile, therefore successfully consolidating his power with
the opposition forces in Cuba as well as with those abroad.
By consolidating power, with a focus on the M-26-7 in the Sierra Maestra, Castro
effectively made himself one of the most important figures in the anti-Batista movement.
Continuing to push the idea that armed insurrection was the only way to triumph against Batista,
many began to see the M-26-7 as the only force capable of defeating Batista. These factors,
under the guise of yet another call for unity, prepared the way for the agreements made in the
Caracas Pact, which would begin to place most major decision making in Castro’s hands.
Castro’s path to power was starting to clear and he would begin to set his sights on Havana.
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CHAPTER 3: BECOMING EL LIDER MAXIMO
The Caracas Pact and the Pedrero Pact were arranged during the second half of 1958 and
both served to strengthen Castro’s position. These pacts also paved the way for the M-26-7 to
move towards Havana and allowed Castro to gain a key leadership role in a post-Batista Cuba.
As the events of the insurrection continued to unfold, Castro took advantage of any opportunity
to reinforce his position of leadership beyond control of the M-26-7. With this in mind, Castro
was aware that he needed to gain, not only greater influence amongst the other anti-Batista
groups but also their acceptance and respect. In order to accomplish this goal, Castro and his
followers took deliberate actions to secure a victory for themselves. This would ensure that once
Batista was defeated, Castro’s position of leadership on the island would be unquestionable.

Operación Verano – May 14 through August 8, 1958
Batista was not going to give up his power, even with mounting pressure from the United
States. In a final attempt to defeat Castro and the M-26-7 guerrillas, Batista launched the
insurrection’s largest military offensive on May 14, 1958. Batista sent approximately 11,000
soldiers to Oriente in what was called Operación Verano, (Operation Summer).134Its objective
was to cut off supplies and reinforcements to the Sierra Maestra in order to isolate the M-26-7
and prepare for a final assault of the rebels’ mountain headquarters. As soon as the operation
began, Castro continued his propaganda campaign by reporting the fighting on Radio Rebelde
with exaggerated claims of rebel victories in order to shift momentum towards the M-26-7.135
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Instead of being defeated, the M-26-7 survived the ordeal, protected the Sierra Maestra and
gained the respected of many Cuban citizens in the process.136 The goal of Operation Summer
was to destroy the M-26-7, yet it actually served to make the Sierra Maestra a symbol of
resistance as many Cubans were led to believe that a guerrilla army could defeat a military
army.137 The failure of Operation Summer only added to the reputation of the M-26-7 guerrillas
and many soldiers deserted Batista and joined the rebels in the Sierra or simply refused to fight
and returned to their homes.
As the struggle between the rebels and the military continued in the mountains, Batista
once again tried to schedule elections in order to give the impression that he was looking for a
democratic solution to the Cuban crisis. Castro responded on Radio Rebelde, stating that, “…the
people are not interested in Batista’s declarations because everyone knows that they are false and
ill-intended.”138 The elections that were scheduled for June 1958 were eventually postponed
until November of that year due to the continuous acts of terrorism orchestrated by the M-26-7 in
attempts to have the elections canceled all together.

Caracas Pact – July 20, 1958139
As Operation Summer was taking place, a majority of the opposition groups came
together in Caracas in mid-July 1958 to produce yet another unity agreement. Having authorized
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the pact, Castro proceeded to read it in full over Radio Rebelde on July 20, 1958.140Agreeing to
put all prior disagreements and tensions aside, the various organizations, of which all opposition
groups were represented with the exception of the PSP, created a united front which they called
the Civic Revolutionary Democratic Front.141The Caracas Pact officially gave Castro the title of
the Commander-in-Chief of all the guerrilla forces, which gave him command of the
revolutionary armed forces and exclusive rights to uphold order after the ousting of Batista.142
Since all of the attending groups were anti-communist, the PSP did not participate in the
meeting in Caracas although it was know that the M-26-7 had socialist sympathizers. Also not
included in the Caracas Pact was Grau San Martín and Márquez-Sterling, who had still hoped
that the situation in Cuba could be fixed through democratic elections. Unlike the circumstances
surrounding the signing of the Miami Pact, the Caracas group was now willing to accept that
guerilla warfare was the most viable option for defeating Batista. The fact that Castro and the
M-26-7 had faced Batista’s military attack on the Sierra Maestra during Operation Summer only
reinforced that idea.
The Caracas Pact included several points that had been dealt with in the other manifestos.
For example, similar to the Miami Pact, it mentioned the formation of a provisional government
that would hold power until fair elections could be held, and included a promise to return Cuba
to the Constitution of 1940. It also reiterated Castro’s previous warnings to the Cuban military
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to stop supporting Batista.143 Although these items had been common in previous
communications, the Caracas Pact was a major victory for Castro for several reasons. One of the
most important reasons was that all of the opposition groups in Caracas agreed to oppose the
electoral process as a means to end the insurgency.144Avoiding elections assured Castro that the
insurrection would continue until Batista was defeated without the threat of another government
being installed.
Appointing of Castro as the Commander-in-Chief of the revolutionary armed forces
insured that the M-26-7 would take control of the military after the fall of Batista.145This is
important because the person that controls the military controls the country in case of a civilian
power vacuum. Much of Cuba’s power came from Camp Columbia, thus in securing military
control, the Caracas Pact unintentionally enforced Castro’s ambition for power. This all worked
in Castro’s favor since one of his primary goals since the beginning of the insurrection was to
demonstrate that only his guerrilla force could secure a victory for the opposition, solidifying his
role as the military leader of all the opposition forces and taking control of the post-Batista
military was without question, a step in that direction.
Also important to this goal, the Caracas Pact agreed that Castro’s hand-picked candidate,
Manuel Urrutia, would serve as the provisional president once the insurrection was over,
effectively ending the debate over the provisional government with the DR.146 Castro claimed to
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have picked Urrutia as provisional president because he had proven himself to be a man of
honor. Castro claimed that Urrutia had proven his integrity when he had declared members of
the M-26-7 not guilty for their involvement in the Granma landing and other violent anti-Batista
acts, since, as Urrutia had stated, they were defending their constitutional rights in taking up
arms against Batista’s unconstitutional government.147 It is more likely that Castro chose Urrutia
because he lacked any political experience and appeared to be a person that could easily be
controlled. It was also important that Urrutia was a moderate who had served 31 years as a
judge, since putting him at the head of the provisional government would allow Castro to counter
the continuing allegations that he was a radical or a communist.148 Up to this point Castro had
never meet Urrutia, but he was well aware that he was a civil servant with no political experience
or any serious political aspirations.149 In choosing Urrutia, Castro was laying the foundations for
a power grab once Batista was removed from office. The Prime Minister held more power than
the president, and Urrutia would appointment Castro to this position just a few weeks into his
presidency.
As Batista’s rescheduled elections approached, Castro declared what he called Law No.
2 from the Sierra Maestra, stating that participation in the elections would be considered an act
of betrayal. Law No. 2 stated that anyone that was detained by the M-26-7 for trying to
participate in the elections would be executed on the spot.150 As the electoral race moved
forward most of the candidates dropped out of the race with the exception of Andrés
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RiveroAgüero. Agüero was a close friend of Batista and the candidate which he had supported
in the elections. It was widely held that elections could not be conducted while Batista was in
power, and Agüero’s uncontested victory supported that idea. Since Agüero was Batista’s
chosen successor, and he ran unopposed, the events surrounding the elections left the majority of
Cubans disappointed with its results. Other candidates for the presidency, such as Carlos
Márquez Sterling, proclaimed that the whole process was a fraud in order to give the presidency
to Batista’s candidate.151 The fiasco of the bogus elections only added to the negative opinions
already affecting Batista, yet he refused to give up power. Even his greatest ally, the United
States were encouraging a political power shift in order to avoid the M-26-7 from taking power,
but no one could convince Batista to back down.152

Pedrero Pact – December 1, 1958
Another effect of the failure of Operation Summer was that it left the Batista’s army in
disarray, which gave the M-26-7 the opportunity to expand its forces in hopes of making a final
push towards Santiago and Havana. In an attempt to split the country in two, Castro commanded
two of his most loyal commanders, Guevara and Cienfuegos to head west.153 Castro hoped that
by taking control of Las Villas, the M-26-7 could effectively stop Batista from sending any
supplies or reinforcements from Havana, thus allowing Castro to control all of Oriente Province.
The two main objectives that he gave to Cienfuegos and Guevara upon entering Las Villas was
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to broaden the reach and influence of the M-26-7 across the country, and to take control of the
region by working out a deal with the DR and the Second Front of the Escambray.154
In a letter to Guevara, Castro stated that the “situation” with the Second Front of the
Escambray was one of his most important responsibilities that he would have to deal with in Las
Villas.155Since Batista’s military had become demoralized, Castro feared that the Escambray
guerrillas had gained too much power in Las Villas province. The Second Front of the
Escambray had been operating in the area for over one year, had established support with the
nearby cities, and was also receiving financial support from Prío. The fact that the Second Front
of the Escambray had more visibility in the area than the M-26-7, particularly worried Castro
since they were much closer to Havana should Batista’s dictatorship suddenly collapse. Since
the Second Front was receiving support from Prío, who was determined to return to power,
Castro knew that it was necessary to either get rid of them or to subordinate them to the M-26-7
leadership.
Having arrived in Las Villas province, one of the first things that Guevara did was to
coordinate the Pedrero Pact with Faure Chomón of the DR. The pact called for the unity of all
the revolutionary forces in Las Villas province; however the Second Front of the Escambray
chose not to take part in the agreement in large part due to their disagreements with Chomón and
the DR.156 Although the DR had maintained a strong stance on working independently of other
groups, the M-26-7’s victory during Operation Summer, and their strong standing during the
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unity pact in Caracas, was enough for them to reconsider.157 Although the pact called for unity,
it was clear that there would only be one leader in Las Villas and that would be Guevara.158
Possibly fearing that the M-26-7 would be successful in defeating Batista, the DR may have
chosen the unity agreement of the Pedrero Pact in hopes of gaining some political power in the
post-Batista government. The PSP also had a small armed group in Las Villas and the
importance of taking the city overrode any apprehensions that the groups previously held
towards the communists, therefore in the Pedrero Pact, all there groups agreed to fight side by
side. With the aid of the DR and the PSP, the forces of Guevara and Cienfuegos soon began to
defeat numerous areas within Las Villas province, rapidly expanding the influences of the
insurrectionary forces.
In late December 1958 the M-26-7 unit commanded by Guevara, consisting of
approximately 300 men, attacked the city of Santa Clara with the support of many of the city’s
residents.159 Although Guevara’s men were outnumbered and outgunned, by the time of the
assault on Santa Clara, most of Batista’s army lacked the will to continue to fight what was
rapidly becoming a losing battle. Although other anti-Batista groups had been in the area far
longer, Guevara was the first to launch attacks in the Escambray and this made him an authority
figure in the eyes of the citizens of Las Villas.160 The rebel forces continued to fight the
diminishing Batista forces for the next two days until they had successfully taken control of
Santa Clara.
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The victory at Santa Clara was significant in that the rebels successfully split the island in
half made it even difficult for the Batista’s army to transport weapons and reinforcements into
Santiago. In anticipation of a rebel victory, in a letter to Guevara, Castro wrote, “It is supremely
important that the advance towards Matanzas and Havana be carried out exclusively by the 26th
of July forces.”161 Batista had not yet been defeated and Castro was already planning for a
takeover of Havana, being cautious that no other anti-Batista groups get in its way. The eventual
fall of Santa Clara into the hands of the rebels made clear to Batista what many of his allies had
been telling him for months; it was no longer possible for him to hold power in Cuba and it was
time for him to flee.162

The Struggle for Leadership in Havana – M-26-7 vs. DR
With the influx of Cuban citizens joining the insurrectional forces after the victory at
Santa Clara and the numerous military desertions, on January 1, 1959 Batista fled Cuba.163 As
the general public rejoiced, the struggle for power between the M-26-7 and the DR began to
reach its climax. Although Batista’s quick exit out of Cuba was supposed to put an end to the
fighting, the days following his departure were a struggle for power as the opposition groups
tried to maintain their relevance in light of Castro’s parade across the country, culminating in his
triumphant entrance into Havana on January 8.
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An eye-witness to the events, U.S. Ambassador Smith described the scene after Batista
left on January 1, 1959 as follows: “It was not until the middle of the day that crowds began to
gather in the streets of Havana. By that time, the troops of the Directorio Revolucionário were
patrolling the streets in jeeps and in commandeered automobiles.”164 Well aware that Castro and
his men were about to claim a victory in Havana, members of the DR occupied the Presidential
Palace, refusing to turn it over to the July 26 Movement.165 The DR’s disagreement with
Castro’s self-imposed authority was clear. The Caracas Pact granted Castro power over the
military but it was becoming evident that Castro wanted total control of the country. Chomón
even complained that Castro had set up a provisional government in Santiago without consulting
any of the other revolutionary groups that had also struggled against Batista.166 Refusing to
leave, on January 4 the M-26-7 had to formally appeal to the DR to vacate the presidential Palace
in order to allow Urrutia to take charge as the provisional president. Castro and the M-26-7 were
clearly trying to take control of Havana and claiming victory for themselves.167 Although they
were openly dissatisfied with the events, the DR eventually gave in to the request, but with the
knowledge that Castro was not willing to share the triumph of Batista’s defeat, they soon began
to accumulate weapons and ammunition.168
In Castro’s first speech to the nation of Cuba, delivered just seven days after these events
took place, he stated, “I tell you that there are members of certain revolutionary organizations
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who are smuggling and storing arms.”169 The revolutionaries that Castro spoke of were the DR,
which were not pleased with Castro taking on the role of the sole leader of the revolution. The
rift between the M-26-7 and the DR had become so strenuous during these crucial days that the
DR procured weapons from an army barracks in an attempt to arm themselves for an attack
against Castro and his newly formed government.170 Castro mentions the theft of the weapons
during his January 9th speech, stating: “Yet I tell you here and now that two days ago elements of
certain organizations broke into the San Antonio barracks, which are under the jurisdiction of
Commander Camilo Cienfuegos and also under my jurisdiction as commander in chief of the
armed forces, and carried away 500 small arms, 16 machine guns, and 80,000 cartridges.”171
During that speech Castro spoke of the new era that Cuba was entering and thanked all
the supporters of the M-26-7. In the process Castro effectively ended the fighting between the
DR and the M-26-7 by making it apparent that no other armed movements were necessary since,
as he put it, “the people of Cuba had spoken.”172 Castro mentioned, “…the popular sympathy
and almost unanimous support of the Cuban youth that the 26th of July Movement enjoyed” and
he argued that there was no need for any other movement.173 With the DR still holding positions
throughout Havana, as well as in Las Villas, Castro pleaded to the mothers to take their son’s
weapons away and stated, “The time to fight is over. What we need is unity.”174 Although
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several members of the DR held their positions, the Camp Columbia speech announced that
Cubans no longer needed weapons to fight one another, the war, Castro declared, was now over.

Castro in Power
On January 7, 1959 the United States officially announced that it recognized the new
Cuban government. In order to disprove any idea that he was taking over the country, Castro
immediately made an effort to show that has was going to restore democracy. The public
seemed convinced as millions rushed to the capital to witness the revolution that was taking
place. Castro’s changes, although mainly a façade to please his audience and the United States,
included the reinstating of Cuba's constitution of 1940. Also, in following the accords of the
Caracas Pact, Manuel Urrutia was installed as the provisional president. This was deemed a
temporary measure until a time when fair elections could be held. José Miró Cardona, who had
aided in the revolutionary underground and had taken part in the signing of the Caracas Pact was
named Prime Minister, a role from which he resigned approximately 6 weeks later.175 Cardona
resigned on February 16th and was replaced by Castro. Cardona later headed the committee that
orchestrated the Bay of Pigs attack on Cuba, and was to head the post-Castro government had the
attack been successful.176
As Castro had predicted in his prison letters during his time at the Isle of Pines, the time
had come to “kill all the cockroaches” and around the island both Batista supporters and anyone
accused of being against the revolution were being taken into custody.177 By mid-January
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Castro’s rebel government began to hold military tribunals, most of which ended in death
sentences as hundreds of military men found themselves facing firing squads. When questioned
about the tribunals, Castro answered that the trials will continue until, “all criminals of the
Batista regime are tried.”178 It was becoming evident that anyone that opposed Castro could
become a target, including members of the new government. Just six months after taking office,
on July 16, 1959, Urrutia was forced to resign amidst accusations of treason and was replaced by
Osvaldo DorticósTorrado, a PSP member who remained faithful to Castro and the revolution for
over twenty years. As Castro took complete control of the government, it was becoming clear
that Cuba was going to be run by a new set of rules and the majority of the ideas that had been
detailed in the manifestos that Castro had taken part in were mainly ignored.

This Time the Revolution is Real
Castro had spoken of the means to victory as being propaganda from the very beginning
and it was propaganda that allowed him to gain control of the island. While in prison at the Isle
of Pines, in a letter that Castro wrote to Luis Conte Agüero, he stated, “The apparatus of
propaganda and organization should be so powerful as to implacably destroy anyone trying to
create fissures, cables, and schisms or to rise against the movement.”179 The fact is that when
Batista fled Cuba, the only movement that had the strength to take power in Havana was the M26-7 and much of that had to do with the way in which Castro approached the manifestos.
Castro’s propaganda campaign was successful as the rhetoric of justice, integrity and honesty
that he had been spreading for years had propelled him to the major leadership role in the
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insurrection. In the end many believed in the myth that Castro had created for himself as the
hero of the Sierra Maestra. The idea that Castro had finally come down from the mountains to
end Cuba’s history of political corruption began to spread as he paraded across the country, but
as history has revealed, this was not exactly what the people had expected of their revolution.

64

CONCLUSION
The history of Cuba’s insurrection has been told numerous times from various
perspectives, yet the manifestos that were written are sources that have been relatively ignored. I
have demonstrated that by focusing on the manifestos we can gain better insight into Castro’s
attitude, in order to better understand his goals and intentions. To Castro the manifestos served
as stepping stones to project himself into a position of power, rather than a binding agreement.
Many people had risked their lives in the anti-Batista struggle while Castro remained relatively
safe in the mountains of the Sierra Maestra.180 The truth is that Castro was never involved in any
great battles with the military, nor was he ever really in any serious danger after the Granma
survivors had regrouped in the Sierra Maestra. In actuality, while the insurrection was mostly
being fought in the cities, Castro’s M-26-7 merely had a small number of skirmishes with remote
military outposts and small factions of military troops in the mountains. The only major threat
that Castro faced throughout the course of the insurrection was the military assault during
Operation Summer, in which Castro and his men narrowly escaped being defeated.181
Two of Castro’s goals during the insurrection were to promote the idea of guerrilla
warfare as the only solution to getting rid of Batista and to avoid elections in the process. He
was able to accomplish both through the use of the manifestos and through successful
propaganda campaigns. Herbert Matthew’s article in the New York Times, which was published
in February 1, 1957, and Robert Taber’s April 27, 1957 interview with Castro helped to promote
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the idea that guerrilla warfare was the only solution to the problem of the dictatorship.182
Throughout the course of the insurrection, Castro set out to make Santiago and the mountains of
the Sierra Maestra, the center of the insurrection. This was accomplished by constantly making
guerrilla warfare the focus of the struggle against Batista, and it was not until Batista fled that
Havana once again became the primary focus. Castro achieved success, through the use of the
propaganda by shifting the focus to a guerrilla war that was greatly exaggerated. In reality it was
those fighting the Batista dictatorship in the cities that were facing the greatest threat of arrest,
torture or even death.
While relatively safely hidden in the mountains of the Sierra Maestra, Castro’s movement
gained momentum and developed a following. Much of this was accomplished through the use
of the manifestos that were geared to promote unity with the Batista opposition. Nonetheless,
the first significant manifesto of the insurrection was the Montreal Pact which was headed by
Prío and published on June 2, 1953 without Castro’s involvement. The Montreal Pact focused
on establishing post-Batista elections, while also condemning acts of terrorism. One of the major
effects that the pact had on Castro was that it caused him to accelerate his plans for the attack on
the Moncada Barracks.183
The attack on the Moncada Barracks resulted in being a complete failure; it did however
help Castro make a name for himself as a figure in the Batista opposition. Castro used this
newly found recognition to release the text, History Will Absolve Me, which served as Castro’s
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first declaration to the people of Cuba.184 This allowed him to put forth his ideas to anyone that
would listen as he explained the errors of Cuba’s past and his suggested remedies for the future.
Cuba’s long history of political corruption served as Castro’s explanation for attacking the
Moncada Barracks. In the text he was attempting to demonstrate that he stood for justice and
democracy for the people, posing those ideas against a history of corruption. However while
Castro was serving time in prison, he had already made it evident through his private letters that
propaganda would play a major role in his movement.185
Upon his release from prison, Castro traveled to Mexico in order to train his army and
continue his propaganda campaign. While in Mexico, Castro released his first manifestos
entitled Manifesto No. 1 and No. 2 which pushed for support from Cuban youth. The main
emphasis of these manifestos was a focus on Cuban economic issues.186 Knowing he needed
help in returning to Cuba, Castro invited Echeverría to Mexico to negotiate the Mexico Pact on
August 20, 1956.187 The Granma landing, however, caused this pact to be ignored as Castro
criticized Echeverría for not providing support. As it has been demonstrated Echeverría was
unaware that Castro’s pending arrival into Cuba had been delayed at sea. Nonetheless, Castro
used this instance as a reason to not support the DR and to completely ignore the conditions of
the Mexico Pact. This became quite evident during the DR’s attempted assassination of Batista
at the president palace, which resulted in a split in the DR and the death of Echeverría and the
majority of the DR leadership.
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One year later, after having established his guerillas in the mountains, on July 12, 1957
Castro released the Manifesto of the Sierra Maestra which served as his declaration of leadership
within the insurrection opposition groups. This manifesto was also signed by Felipe Pazos and
Raúl Chibás with the intention of making Castro appear as a moderate. The manifesto called for
the unity of all the opposition groups, as well as between the sierra and the llano. It also asked
all political parties to, “reject the crude electoral process.”188 After the release of the Manifesto
of the Sierra Maestra, which chose Urrutia as the provisional president, the M-26-7 stayed
relatively quite as to their intentions after the fall of the dictatorship. Less than three weeks later,
Chief of Police Colonel José Salas Cañizares killed Frank Pais on July 30, 1957, leaving Castro
as the sole leader of the M-26-7.
Castro however was not afraid to speak up when several opposition groups declared their
unity by signing the Miami Pact on November 1, 1957. Although it declared a move towards
guerrilla warfare, Castro opposed it because it went against major decisions that he had put forth
in the MSM. One of the decisions was the choosing of a provisional president. The Miami Pact
had named Pazos, ignoring Castro’s choice in Urrutia. The fact that the Miami Pact was
organized without Castro’s input is another reason that he attempted to discredit it. Stating that
the Miami Pact was worthless since it was signed by people living abroad, carry out an
“imaginary revolution” Castro made it clear that he and his men were the only legitimate
revolutionaries.189
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Castro discredited the Miami Pact and in turn forced the Miami junta to dissolve.
Enforcing his idea that guerrilla warfare was the only solution, Castro drafted the Total War
Against the Tyranny Manifesto on March 12, 1958. This manifesto was signed by Castro and
Faustino Pérez and demanded that all Cuban citizens join in on a total war strategy against the
dictatorship.190 Castro’s message was clear, the electoral process was no longer an option, and
even threatened anyone who would participate in an election.191 When the declaration of the
Total War was made, Castro began his plans for the April 9 strike. As I have shown, the strike
was simply another of Castro’s attempts to consolidate power and ensure that the M-26-7 was
the strongest anti-Batista organization in Cuba. Contrary to what other writers have claimed, the
evidence demonstrates that Castro purposefully set up the strike to fail. His betrayal of the urban
underground secured that the M-26-7 would be controlled by the guerrilla in the mountains. This
was made evident during the meeting at Altos del Mompié were Castro declared himself the sole
leader of both the rural and urban branches on the M-26-7.192
When the Caracas Pact was transmitted over Radio Rebelde on July 19, 1958 it provided
Castro with the power that he had been seeking. As with the other manifestos, the Caracas Pact
included all of the major opposition groups, with the exception of the PSP. One of the most
important factors discussed during the development of the Caracas Pact was the fact that it gave
Castro power over the military in the post-Batista government. The person that controlled the
military could also take control of the country and being aware of this, the Caracas Pact worked
to Castro’s benefit.
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Batista’s final attempt to defeat the M-26-7 came in June with Operation Summer which
lasted from June 28 until August 8, 1958. This victory strengthened Castro and M-26-7’s
reputation and proved that the Sierra Maestra guerrillas could resist Batista’s military.193 This
led to a rise in recruits and this expansion allowed Castro to send guerrillas out of the mountains
and into the plains. Cienfuegos and Guevara were assigned the task of reaching Santa Clara and
talking command over the guerrillas in the region. Guevara was the first to reach the Escambray
Mountains, where he coordinated the Pedrero Pact with the DR and the PSP, while also ignoring
the Second Front of the Escambray.194This was the only time throughout the course of the
insurrection that a deal was made between any major anti-Batista organization and the PSP.195
This pact was vital in that it organized a collaborated effort between the three groups with the
goal of taken Santa Clara. This was clearly a strategic move by Castro, as he was preparing for
the race for Havana incase Batista fled the island, which is what happened shortly after Santa
Clara was taken by the rebels.
Once Batista fled Cuba, Castro wanted it to be clear that the M-26-7 was in charge of the
country until a new government could be formed. Although there were several opposition
groups that played important roles throughout the insurrection, they were now all ignored as
Castro’s chosen candidate, Urrutia became the interim president.196 Even the return of Carlos
Prio, who had been ousted by Batista, was ignored, and he eventually returned to exile. With
Castro and the M-26-7 in charge of the country, the changes came very quickly. These changes
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led to the first Castro-era mass exodus from the island, which saw a mass departure of the
wealthy elite and former politicians.
Although it had been Castro’s idea of Urrutia replacing Batista, by July 17, 1959 Castro
had accused Urrutia of treason and replaced him with Osvaldo Dorticós, an obscure lawyer
which would be easy to control.197 Urrutia’s role as president ended up lasting just under 6
months. The fact was that it did not matter who held which title in the new government, Castro
made himself the face of the revolution, and it was evident that he was now in charge. Important
figures of the insurrection, such as Echeverría and País, who had given their lives in the struggle
against Batista, were made into symbols and martyrs of the revolution, yet their ideas of
democracy and their anti-communist views were ignored in Cuba’s new history.
The focus of the new government was now to discredit anyone or anything that had
anything to do with the old system of government. Anyone that opposed the new system was
labeled an anti-revolutionary and punished. For example, Huber Matos, who had assisted the M26-7 by flying weapons from Costa Rica into the Sierra Maestra, was sentenced to 20 years in
prison for simply trying to resign from his post as Commander of the Army in Camagüey
Province.198
Meanwhile, the PSP which had not been invited to participate in any of the pact
negotiations prior to the Pedrero Pact and had joined the anti-Batista struggle very late, began to
replace the M-26-7. It did not matter that none of the anti-Batista organizations supported the
PSP, Castro’s new ideas began to replace the old. Communism however, would only be allowed
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on Castro’s terms. Although it is unknown at what point during the insurrection Castro became a
communist, according to Juan Almeida, a member of M-26-7 guerrilla army, Castro always
carried a Lenin book with him while in the Sierra Maestra.199Castro himself stated, “…if we had
stopped at the Pico Turquino, when there were very few of us, and said: ‘We are MarxistLeninists,’ possibly we would not have been able to get down to the plain.”200
Once the revolutionary government was established, history could only be published with
official permission from the Cuban government. This allowed Castro’s government to credit the
M-26-7 with the ousting of Batista.201What this meant was that the story of the insurrection could
now only be told from the perspective of the guerrillas in the Sierra Maestra, with all other
participants being made into minor figures. Even major accomplishments of the revolutionary
government, such as the attempt to eradicate illiteracy were used to promote the government’s
agenda. Those that participated in the literacy program were taught to read and write by learning
about the M-26-7 and it heroes, which at this time also included the PSP. Although Castro had
declared many years earlier, upon his release from Isle of Pines, “Our message of gratitude, is for
the people and journalists, to whom we shall always be deeply grateful” censorship of the press
was strictly enforced.202 After taking power Castro went as far as stating, “The rebel army won
the war by telling the truth. I want to continue the system of always telling the people the
truth.”203 The stories of the insurrectionary period, however, did not seem to apply.
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APPENDIX A: MANIFESTO No. 1 TO THE PEOPLE OF CUBA - AUGUST 8, 1955204
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I live for my fatherland and for its true freedom, although I know that my life may not last long
enough to enjoy the fruit of my labors and that this service must be given with the certainty and
thought of receiving no reward for it.
José Martí
My duties to the fatherland and to my convictions stand above all personal concerns; that is why
I shall be free or shall perish for the redemption of my people.
Antonio Maceo

Under this battle cry, which recalls past national rebellion, the Cuban revolutionary
movement it today organized and prepared for its great task of redemption and justice.
By the express agreement of its leaders, I have been entrusted with the drafting of this
first manifesto to the country and those which in the future will be published clandestinely.
In carrying out this mission which duty imposes on me, I do not hesitate to assume the
responsibility involved in signing these proclamations that will be a constant reminder to the
people, an open call for revolution, and a frontal attack against the clique of criminals who
trample the honor of the nation and rule its destiny counter to its history and the sovereign will of
the people. And although at the present time I am absent from the soil of our nation and
therefore outside the jurisdiction of the courts that issue the sentences ordered by the master, I
did not hesitate to unmask the executioner when that court was judging me there, or from prison
to accuse by name the dictator and his bloodthirsty generals of the Moncada Barracks’ crimes in
a manifesto dated January 6, 1954, or to reject amnesty with conditions attached, to again, when
freed, to show that people evidence of the cruel and inhuman character of the Batista regime.
What a cruel and inhuman apparatus Batista’s regime has! I do not care what accusations they
may make against me in the special courts! Cuba is my fatherland, and I shall never return to it
or I shall return with the dignity I have pledged myself to. The bridges have been burned: Either
we conquer the fatherland at any price so that we can live with dignity and honor, to we shall
remain without one.
The fatherland means something more than oppression, something more than a piece of
land without freedom and without life.
It is hardly necessary to justify the use of this means to set forth out ideas. The closing
down of the newspaper La Calle, whose courageous stand won it the sympathy of the people,
increasing its circulation to more than 20,000 copies in only a few weeks, made clear the more or
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less concealed muzzle with the dictatorship has maintained over the legal press in Cuba for more
than three years.
The censorship and the Law on Pubic Order, by which the regime sought to conceal from
the people the barbarous Moncada massacre, are a threat to the mass media, the closing down of
the civic-spirited newspaper of Luis Orlando was yet another warning to the press that their
opinions cannot exceed certain limits, in reality so as not to threaten those in power. The same
warnings were given on other occasions with the torture of Mario Kucjilán and Armando
Hernández, the assault on the “University of the Air” and the newspaper Pueblo, the castor oil
torture of the CMKC announcers, the attacks on numerous photographers, the sentencing of Luis
Conte Agüero and Pincho Gutiérrez, the confinement of Pardo Lllada, Guido García Inclán, Max
Lesnick, Rivadulla, García Sifredo, and others arbitrary actions which make the list of attacks on
the free expression of thought since March 10 interminable.
The governmental “inquisition” was especially cruel with regard to this writer. After our
article in Bohemia answering the cowardly provocation of a miserable henchman who went out
for blood but ended up bleeding, our appearance on any radio or television program was
drastically and categorically prohibited.
On two consecutive occasions the Partido del Pueblo Cubano broadcasts were prevented.
The broadcasts could continue only on the condition that I would not be heard by the people. In
an urgent telegram dated June 13, 1955, the network was informed that proceedings had been
initiated to deprive me of this right. This was an unprecedented case: It was not a radio station
or a program that was censured, but a citizen. That great hustler of governmental favors, Ramón
Vasconcelos, who bought a newspaper when he was a minister under Carlos Prío and who
launched the most terrible attacks against him when Prío took off with everything, was not
closed down – and he was not even a Batista supporter just prior to March 10, because he was
trying to obtain a senatorial post through the Ortodoxo Party. He has found his own method o
concealing the truth.
Every instrument of power was used successfully to impose silence on me everywhere,
which demonstrates to what extent any new moral protest is doomed today in Cuba because of
the shameful coalition of oppression, vested interests, and general hypocrisy.
Thus, Santiago Rey, another cynic who was a Prío follower until March 10, 1952, a
Batista follower until October 10, 1944, and a Machado follower until August 12, 1933, ordered
the closing of the newspaper La Calle the day our article entitled “One Can No Longer Live
Here” appeared. We answered one of the stupid accusations of Colonel Carratalá and challenged
him to go to the courts and denounce the names of the police chiefs who have gotten rich from
the proceeds of illegal gambling. We were left without a platform from which to express our
views.
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The same happened with every public gathering at which it was known we would be
present, beginning with the meeting to welcome the political prisoners on the university steps.
They went to the extreme of prohibiting the showing of a film of our visit to the National News
Agnecy with Guido García Inclán, for they were irritated by the demonstrations of sympathy
expressed by the public. We were left without the right to speak or write or hold public
gatherings or to exercise civic rights of any kind – as if we were not Cubans, as if we had no
rights in our fatherland, as if we had been born pariahs and slaves in the glorious land of our
immortal liberators. Can this be called constitutionality, equality before the law, guarantees for
peaceful struggle?
In Cuba one only has the right to write what pleases the six libelous papers the
dictatorship maintains with the money stolen from teachers and public employees. In Cuba only
the unconstitutional supports of the regime or those who play the game of a docile and
inoffensive opposition have the right to meet freely. In Cuba only those who get down on their
knees have the right to live.
The bad faith of the regime, the mean spirit on which the amnesty the people demanded
was granted, had been obvious from the very first moments. Three days after we had been freed
the first false accusation of subservient activity was hurled at us, when our families had not even
had time to welcome us and express their joy in the naïve belief that a different stage of calm and
respect from the citizen was beginning, and that their children would not find themselves again
involved in the maelstrom of revolutionary struggle, agony, and martyrdom which had already
lasted three and a half years. In this struggle the greatest pain is not that of the fighter who
struggles resolutely, without worrying about the risk, but that of the mothers who, as Martí said,
weep with inconsolable sorrow “out of love and not reason.”
We had changed prisons. The spectacle of hunger and injustice was everywhere. And
the harsh struggle that idealism required, dignity demanded, and duty ordered, began again, to
end only when no oppressors remain in Cuba or when the last revolutionary falls on this sad and
martyred land.
Those who doubt the determination with which we shall carry forward our promise those
who believe that we are reduced to impotence because we have no private fortune to put at the
disposal of our cause nor millions stolen from the people, should remember the twenty-six of
July. They should remember that a handful of men who had been ignored, without economic
resources of any kind, and without weapons except their dignity and their ideals, stood up to the
second largest military installation in Cuba and did what other with cast resources have not yet
done. They should remember that there is a people with faith in its honored defenders, ready to
gather the necessary funds penny by penny so that those who will achieve freedom with honest
blood and honest money will not be without weapons again. Finally let them remember that for
each one of the young men who fell at Santiago de Cuba there are thousand more awaiting the
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signal to go into battle, that the revolutionary reserves of the people now include a hundred
thousand idealists. And for each of those writers who preach cowardice, vilification, defeatism,
and compromise with the oppressors, advising our people to submit peacefully to tyranny,
renouncing their tradition as a rebellious and honorable people as if nothing had happened in
Cuba on march 10, there are a million voices cursing them.
The voices are those who suffer hunger in the countryside and the cities, the desperate
voices of those who have no work or hope of finding any, the indignant voices of our workers for
whom it was a cursed hour when Batista snatched power, the voices of an entire people trampled
on and deceived, who have seen their children murdered in the shadows and who are not
resigned to living without rights and freedom.
Stubborn fools are those who believe that a revolutionary movement can be measured by
the millions of available to it and not by the reason, idealism, determination, and honor of its
fighters! “What matters,” Martí said, “is not the number of weapons in one’s hand, but the
number of stars on one’s forehead!” to those who ask us to abandon the revolutionary struggle
and accept the crumbs of legality the regime offers, we answer, Why do you not ask Batista to
abandon office first?
He is the only obstacle. It was he who used violence when all legal paths were open. He
protects and safeguards the henchmen who murder and kill. He, only he, it the man who has
provoked this situation of uncertainty, unrest, and ruin.
Why ask a people to renounce their rights instead of asking a lucky adventurer to
abandon a power that does not belong to him? To those who impudently advise participation in
partial elections as a national solution we answer: Who is concerned with those elections? The
discontent is found, not on the part of the politicians who seek posts, but in the people who seek
justice. Those who believe that serious political, social, and economic problems can be solved
by simply satisfying the appetites of a hundred or so miserable candidates for a few posts as
mayors and representative think very badly of Cuban citizens. What have petty politics given the
county in the last 50 years? Speeches, sinecures, congas, lies, compromises, deceit, betrayals,
improper enrichment of a clique of rogues, empty talk, corruption, infamy. We do not view
politics as the traditional politicians do. We are concerned not with the personal benefit but with
the benefit of the people whom we serve as missionaries of an ideal of redemption. Glory is
worth more than triumph, and “there is only one glory for certain – that of a soul at peace with
itself.” Those electoral crumbs with which Batista buy his unimportant enemies should not be
offered to us. The pride with which we put them aside is worth more than all of the electoral
posts put together.
To those who speak of general elections, we ask: Elections with or without Batista? The
general elections on November 1 with Batista were the most scandalous and fraudulent in our
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republican history, a permanent stain on our democratic tradition that set us back to a stage
which it seemed we had transcended. What answer have the defenders of an election presided
over by Batista? What arguments do they have left after this unprecedented scandal? Did they
not employ precisely the same reasons, the same words, the same lies before? Can anyone forget
the mobilization of tanks along the highways and the dramatic farewells by Tabernilla at the
terminal station, as if the soldiers were leaving for the battlefield? After that November
experience, after the March 10 coup within 80 days of elections, for the simple reason that they
did not have the slightest chance of winning, can anyone make our skeptical people believe in
honest elections with Batista in power? Those who want to create the illusion that the events of
1944 could be repeated deliberately and criminally betray the people. They pretend to make us
believe that the circumstances are the same. They forget the signs of the times. They do not
distinguish between the present moment in which America has been invaded by reactionary
dictatorships and 1944, when the world was shaken by a wave of popular enthusiasm and
democratic optimism, a world which with the last shots in Europe conceived hopes for a happier
and more humane future for its peoples. Batista then yielded to world public opinion, as the
cowardly ruling cliques of Peru, Venezuela, Guatemala, and other countries of the American
continent yielded.
Therefore the only civic solution we would accept, the only honest, logical, and just
solution, is immediate general elections without Batista. Meanwhile, we shall continue tirelessly
out revolutionary line. And we have a question for those who demand general elections as the
only solution: What will you do if Batista flatly refuses to allow elections? Will you cross your
arms and weep like Mary Magdalene for what you lacked the courage to demand with honor?
“Rights are taken, not begged; they are seizes, not pleased for.” The people await the answer
too.
To those who affirm that the 1940 Constitution has been reestablished, we state that they
are brazenly lying, a fundamental principle of our constitution categorically prohibits presidential
reelection, and Batista reelected himself to that post of November 1. He did not even resign his
post: He asked for a leave of absence and left a lackey in the presidential palace. If the
Constitution states that anyone who has occupied that post cannot so do again until eight years
have gone by, Batista’s continuation in the presidency is unconstitutional.
Another precept establishes that sovereignty resides in the people and that from them all
powers all derived. If this is true, and the Constitution is in effect, none of these who elected
themselves in the unilateral and fraudulent November first elections has the right to occupy the
posts he holds. All of them should resign immediately. Sovereignty resides in the people and
not in the barracks. Batista is the main enemy of our constitution, which he ignominiously
destroyed on March 10. There is not room for both in the same republic.
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To those who accuse the Revolution of upsetting the economy of the country, we answer:
There is no economy for the rural workers who have not land; there is no economy for the
millions of Cubans who are unemployed; there is no economy for the railroad, port, sugar, hemp,
textile, and bus workers and those in the many sectors whose wages Batista had mercilessly
reduced. And there will be an economy for them only through a just revolution that will
redistribute the land, mobilize the vast resources of the country, and equalize social conditions,
putting an end to privilege and exploitation. It is possible to expect that miracle from the
candidates running in the forthcoming partial elections?
Or are they talking perhaps of the economy of the senators who earn 5,000 pesos a
month, of the millionaire generals, of the foreign trusts that exploit the public services, of the
great landowners, of the tribe of parasites who thrive and get rich at the expense of the state and
the people? Then we welcome the Revolution that upsets the economy of a few who so greedily
profit from it! After all, man does not live by bread alone.
Another question for those who speak of economy: Has not Batista jeopardized the credit
of the country for 30 years? Has not the public debt increased to more than 800 million pesos?
Is there not a deficit of more than 100 million? Are not the monetary reserves of the nation
pledged to foreign banks in a desperate search of money? Were not 300 million pesos of the
most recent loan wastes in the purchase of jet planes and things of that nature, without plan or
program, for no other reason than personal whim? Can one play in this manner with the destiny
of a nation? Did anyone authorize him to undertake those insane credit ventures? Did he consult
the people in any way? Finally, how many millions have individuals very close to Batista
transferred periodically to North American banks? It is for us more than anyone else to be
concerned because we and future generations will have to pay the terrible consequences of that
corrupt and unchecked policy. The country’s economy requires an immediate and radical change
of government.
To those who assert that the Revolution brings sorrow to Cuban families, we answer:
Sorrow is caused by the hunger decimating families in the Cuban countryside; sorrow is caused
by the corrupt politicians who steal hospital funds; sorrow is caused by the henchmen who
murdered Rubén Batista, the Santiago couple Oscar Medina Salomón and María Rodríquez, the
Camagüey labor leader Mario Aróstegui, the Auténtico leader Matio Fortuny, the revolutionary
soldier Gonzalo Miranda Oliva, the naval commander Jorge Agostini, and the seventy young
prisoners in the Moncada Barracks. This is the blood of students, workers, professional, honest
military men, men and women of all partiers and all social classes – honest blood, Cuban blood,
the blood of fighters who could not defend themselves at the moment they were sacrificed.
Today more than ever the spokesmen of the dictatorship emphasize public discussion and
legal methods as the path their opponents should follow. They did not think that way when on
March 10 they perpetrated the most unjustifiable crime conceivable against a nation, and at that
79

time all legal paths were really open for political struggle! Now that they have blocked all paths
toward peace, they speak of peace. Now that everything had been arranged through force to suit
them, they defend legality. Now after four years of being in power, a power to which they have
no right, getting rich and profiting under the eyes of the entire nation, distributing privileges and
sinecures among friends, unconditional supporters, and relatives of the whole clique, having
constantly used abuse and force to maintain their privileges, not they shout that the only just and
descent way of fighting them is through politics. Politics, as conceived by Martí and as we
understand it, is the art of keeping the peace and greatness of the country, but not the vile art of
creating a fortune at its expense.
The fatherland is not a tool we can use or discard as we choose; nor is the Republic a
means of maintaining the lazy and the haughty, well fed and housed, who in the baseness of the
egotism believe themselves to be the natural responsibility of the country and the inevitable
masters of their inferior people.
Those who chant their devout songs in favor of peace as if there could be peace without
freedom, peace without law, peace without justice, have still not found the words to condemn the
one hundred crimes which have been committed since March 10, not the daily outrages, the raids
on homes in the middle of the night, the arbitrary arrests, the false accusations, the unjust
convictions. What have they said about the young man from Guantánamo, a humble employee
of the newspaper La Calle, who was atrociously tortured and on whose strangled testicles
corrosive acid was thrown by his executioners? Nothing! Absolutely nothing!
Beware, Cubans, of those who advice cowardly submission to the tyranny, whatever the
source of this advice, because these people are paid a price for their hypocritical sermons by
Batista.
The peace Batista wants is the peace Spain wanted. The peace we want is the peace
Martí wanted.
To speak of peace under tyranny is to offend the memory of all those who died for the
freedom and happiness of Cuba. Then as well there were reformists and autonomists who fought
with cowardly fury the honorable attitude of our liberators and accepted as a solution the
electoral crumbs offered by the master of that era.
The streets and the parks of our cities and towns bear the names and proudly display the
statues of Maceo, Martí, Máximo Gómez, Calixto García, Céspedes, Agramonte, Flor Crombet,
Bartolomé Masó, and other illustrious heroes who had the courage to rebel. The schools teach
out glorious history, and October 10 and February 24 are celebrated with devotion. These were
not dates of submission or of resigned and cowardly acceptance of the existing despotism, nor
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were those individuals the ones who extended a begging hand to receive from Spain a post as a
deputy to the royal court or in the senate of the colonial master.
All the regime’s efforts will be futile. The 26th of July Movement will send its
revolutionary message to all corners of Cuba. Tens of thousands of our revolutionary manifestos
will circulate clandestinely throughout the country, invading factories, farms, and villages. Men
and women who want to aid our case will reproduce them by hand or machine everywhere,
knowing that thereby they are doing their little bit in this heroics struggle of the nation against its
oppressors. They will even penetrate the barracks, the warships, the police stations, and the
military camps.
We do not fear talking to the military, we have no hatred in our hearts for the honest
Cubans – the military man who has been vilely used as a tool so that cliques of politicians gain
power and wealth, the military man who is forced to constant and cruel guard duty to safeguard
the interests of a handful of scoundrels who take no risks; the military man who is forced to die
without glory for a regime hated by the people; the military man whom Batista miserably
deceived. Batista had not yet found a way of justifying the unlimited enrichment of the high
commanders, not the violations of military seniority in favor of the families and friends of the
generals, setting aside merit and ability, not the presence of gangsters in the government, not the
frequent decreases in wage while every senator whom no one elected and who represents no one
collects 5,000 pesos. Batista himself had increased his income to the fabulous sum of 70,000 per
month, seventy times what the prime minister of England earns. We defeated the military when
no one defended them, and fought them when they supported the tyranny, but we shall welcome
them with open arms when they join the cause of liberty. We shall tell the military the truth, as
one Cuban to another, as one man to another, without fear or flattery, and the hands and the
hearts of many honest soldiers will be reached by our revolutionary proclamations. The military
must be freed from tyranny too.
The 26th of July Movement is formed without hatred for anyone. It is not apolitical party
but a revolutionary movement. Its ranks are open to all Cubans who sincerely desire to see
political democracy reestablished and social justice introduced in Cuba. Its leadership is
collective and secret, formed by new men of strong will who are not accomplices of the past. Its
structure is functional. Young and old, men and women, workers and peasants, students and
professionals, can join in its fighting groups, its youth cadres, its secret worker’s sells, its
women’s organizations, its economic sections, and its underground distribution apparatus
throughout the country, for not all can take up arms. There will never be sufficient weapons to
equip each of those who wishes to give his life in the struggle, but each can participate to the
extent that he can, contributing money, distributing proclamations, or leaving work in a gesture
of solidarity and proletarian support when the revolutionary call to struggle comes. Above all,
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this must be a revolution of the people, with the blood of the people and the sweat of the people.
Its broad and courageous program can be synthesized in the following essential points:
1. Outlawing of the latifundia, distribution of the land among peasant families;
permanent and untransferable granting of property to all existing small tenant
farmers, sharecroppers, small holders, and farm laborers; state economic and
technical aid; reduction of taxes.
2. Reestablishment of all the worker’s gains taken away by the dictatorship the right of
the worker to broad participation in the profits of all the large industrial, commercial,
and mining enterprises, which should be paid out in addition to salaries or wages at
given intervals during the year.
3. Immediate industrialization of the country by means of a vast plan made and
promoted by the state, which will have to decisively mobilize all the human and
economic resources of the nation in the supreme effort to free the country from the
moral and material prostration in which it finds itself. It is inconceivable that they
should be hunger in a country as endowed by nature; every shelf should be stocked
with goods and all hands employed productively.
4. Drastic decrease in all rents, effectively benefiting the 2,200,000 persons who are
today spending a third of their income on rent; construction by the state of decent
housing to shelter the 400,000 families crowded into filthy single rooms, huts, shacks,
and tenements; extension of electricity to the 2,800,000 persons in our rural and
suburban sectors who have none initiation of a policy designed to transform each
renter into an owner of the apartment in which me lives on the basis of long-term
amortization.
5. Nationalization of public services: telephone, electricity, and gas.
6. Construction of ten children’s cities to fully shelter and educate 200,000 children of
workers and peasants who cannot currently feed and clothe them.
7. Extension of education, following a previous reform of all teaching methods, to the
farthest corner of the country, so that every Cuban will be able to develop his mental
and physical aptitudes in a descent living environment.
8. General reforms of the tax system and establishment of modern methods for the
collection of taxes to avoid tax evasion and mishandling of funds, so that the state can
meet its needs and the people will know that what they pay from their income goes
back to society to benefit all classes.
9. Reorganization of public administration and establishment of administrative training.
10. Establishment of an inviolable military roster safeguarding the members of the armed
forces so that they can be removed from their post only for good reasons proved in
administrative litigation courts. Elimination of the death penalty in the Military Penal
Code for crimes committed during peacetime. Rendering of all socially beneficial
82

services by the armed services throughout the country, making economic surveys,
land surveys and demarcation, and building by their corps of engineers, with special
remuneration, hygienic schools and decent housing for peasants, workers, and
members of the armed forces themselves, who will retain ownership when they retire
from service.
11. Generous and decent pay to all public employees: teachers, office workers, and
members of the armed forces, retired civil and military personnel.
12. Establishment of adequate measures in education and legislation to put an end to
every vestige of discrimination for reasons of race or sex which regrettably still exists
in our social and economic life.
13. Social security and state unemployment compensation.
14. Reorganization of the judicial branch and abolition of the treasury courts.
15. Confiscation of all the assets of embezzlers acquired under all past governments,
without exceptions of any kind, so that the Republic can recover the hundreds of
millions which have been taken from it with impunity. These will be invested in the
implementation of some the undertakings describes above. Does anyone doubt that
they could have been possible if the nation had had honest governments?
These points will be fully explained in a pamphlet that will be distributed throughout the
country.
The Cuban Revolution will carry out all of the reforms following the spirit and the letter
of our 1940 Constitution, without taking from anyone what is legitimately his and
compensating everyone for the losses he has suffered, fully aware that in the long run all
of society will be benefited.
The Cuban Revolution will firmly punish all the acts of violence against the individual
committed under the tyranny, but it will reject and repress any evidence of ignoble
vengeance inspired by hatred or base passions.
The Cuban Revolution does not compromise with groups or persons of nay sorts, nor
does it offer anyone governmental employment or posts within the armed forces. It will
respect competence and merit wherever it may be found, and it will never regard the state
as the booty of a triumphant group. A revolutionary movement which has already given
the fatherland a legion of heroic martyrs who neither prospered from the nation nor had
any ambition but to serve their country tirelessly and without self-interest can speak thus
to the nation.
In adopting again the line of sacrifice we assume before history responsibility for our
actions. And in making our declaration of faith in a happier world for the Cuban people,
we think like Martí that a sincere man does not seek where his adventure lies but where
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his duty is, and that the only practical man is the one whose present dream will be the law
of tomorrow.
On behalf of the 26th of July Revolutionary Movement,
Fidel Castro
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We will find generous help in all honey hearts. And we will knock on all doors, and we will ask
for contributions from town to town. And they will give, because we will ask with honor.
José Martí
I am addressing these lines essentially to the generous men and women of my fatherland.
I still remember the unforgettable scenes I witnessed among the Cuban émigrés to the United
States. Everywhere I saw Cubans standing, their hands raised high, swearing not to rest until
they saw their land redeemed, and then en masse they deposited in the mambi hat the product of
their sweat which they earned through hard work. But that was not their only contribution. One
does not need to look for the exiled Cubans to obtain their aid; after every public gathering they
can be seen in the streets asking for the address of the Patriotic Club where they join and offer
their weekly contributions. Every Sunday Cuban parties are organized, and what is collect is
given entirely to the Revolution. The first of these, held just a few days ago in New York,
produced hundreds of pesos. All the beauty of our historical tradition is evidenced by the Cuban
exiles with astonishing fervor. Already there are Patriotic Clubs functioning in Bridgeport,
Union City, New York, Miami, Tampa, and Key West. New groups will be organized in
Chicago Philadelphia, Washington, and other places where the Cubans who have had to leave
their native land have settled. Seven weeks of tireless effort dedicated to organizing the Cubans
from the Canadian border to the glorious Key have produced the best of results.
The 26th of July Movement, which unites and organizes all of the country’s revolutionary
forces in a close and disciplined organization, breaking away from the traditional framework in
which petty Cuban politics have existed up to the present, has called on our émigré brothers –
who are also Cubans suffering from the misfortunes of Cuba – to struggle. The émigré have
responded unanimously to the appeal of the 26th of July. They have provided hundreds of young
fighters, many of them veterans of the European and Pacific theaters in World War II, who now
want to fight for the cause of liberty in their own land. Moreover, they are providing abundant
economic resources so that the noble and virile individuals who will challenge the tyranny once
again with the cry “liberty or death” on their lips will not go unarmed.
There are some who have not yet understood the meaning of the public preaching of a
revolutionary idea, and they wonder if this does not put the oppressors on guard. They forget
many things, but mainly that we are nit millionaires with huge sums deposited in bans. They
forget that we are not rich, nor do we have private means to make available to our cause. We
would offer them without hesitation if we had them, just as we are offering all that we do have –
our energy and our lives. They forget that a revolution, unlike a military putsch, is the work of
the people, and it is necessary that the people know beforehand what they must do in the
struggle. In revolution, as Martí states, “the methods are secret and the goals are public.”
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Does anyone believe that when our liberators publically solicited aid from the cigar
makers of Tampa and Key West they wanted to conceal from the Spanish authorities that a
revolution was developing in Cuba? If we are not embezzlers or rich men, how can we obtain
the resources essential for the struggle it we so not ask the people for them? And how can we
ask the people for resources if we do not tell them what we will do with the money? If the
Revolution robs a bank to get funds, the enemy will call us gangsters. If the Revolution accepts
aid from embezzlers who have plundered the Republic, the Revolution will be betraying its
principles. Of the Revolution solicits aid from vested interests, it will be compromised before it
attains power.
We have already gone to battle once with the limited resources we could obtain, each of
us giving what little he had and quietly soliciting the aid of some generous individuals, and the
result was defeat and the horrible crimes which followed. It would have been useless then to ask
for help publically, because no one would have paid attention to us. Faith lay with other men
who were expected to do everything against oppression. Today, after paying such a high price in
sacrifice and lives for the confidence of our compatriots, we shall do what we could not do then.
We shall publically appeal to the people to help us, to prepare the country for revolution on a
major scale, with possibility of failure. We shall set forth the actions the masses must carry out
everywhere when national rebellion breaks out like a storm, so that the fighting detachments,
well-armed and led, and the active youth cadres will be supported by the workers throughout the
country, organized from below in revolutionary cells, capable of unleashing a general strike.
What the enemy will never know is where the weapons are hidden and at what movement and
how the insurrection will erupt. If the corrupt politicians publically their electoral thesis, the
Revolution much publically preach its thesis of rebellion.
To preach revolution aloud will undoubtedly produce better results than to speak of peace
in public and conspire in secret, which was the method used for three and a half years by the
group removed from power on March 10. Their secret conspiracy was never a secret to anyone.
Thanks to our campaign it is clear that, despite the return of the Auténticos from exile, many of
whom erroneously thought that the insurrectional stage had ended, revolutionary feeling and
agitation are stronger than ever throughout the nation. Our cry “Revolution! Revolution!” is the
slogan of the masses whenever people gather. All of the electoral plans of the regime to
maintain itself in power with the complicity of the political cliques of the pseudo-opposition
have been destroyed by or strategy. Only the blind, the greedy, the envious, or the impotent
could deny this.
The national panorama is clearing. Events are finally proving us right. The massacres of
workers, the street battles between students and police, the increasing economic crisis with its
hunger and misery, the unchecked rise of the public debt which has compromised the credit of
the nation for thirty years, the men who have disappeared without a trace, the crimes committed
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with impunity, the daily embezzlements, and the haughty and categorical refusal by the dictator
to one hundred thousand citizens who gathered at the Muelle de Luz indicate that no alternative
remains for the country but revolution. Those who to date have maintained other theses not have
only two choices: They must either surrender to the regime or join the Revolution, whose
standard we alone held high when everyone was running around in search of an electoral
compromise with the dictatorship. Even the most humble citizen correctly interprets the
situation in Cuba when he says that Baista and hos clique of millionaire generals have been
deceiving the public for four years and that they will not give up their powers unless they are
thrown out by force. To the cowards who say that he has the tanks, the guns, and the planes, the
answer of a nation with dignity must be, “Well then, we too have to get together the necessary
weapons. We have to give the fighters the economic resources they need. If the tyranny forces
us by taxes to purchase its weapons and pay its police, we should contribute our resources
voluntarily to those who for four years have been fighting and dying for our freedom. We have
to aid them because the duty to sacrifice oneself for the fatherland is the duty of all and not just a
few. We have to aid them because the frivolous life, the life of indifference when the country is
in agony, is a crime when others are suffering in prison or in exile or are already buried in
debased soil.”
Each citizen should give a dollar, each worker should contribute the earning of one day’s
work, as the Cuban émigrés are going to do on January 28, and you will see how the tyranny
resoundingly collapses in less time than many imagine.
Those of us who lead an austere and poor life, devoted without rest or respite to the
struggle, giving the country our youth and our life, working for six million Cubans without
asking anything of anyone, we feel that we have the moral authority and courage to speak to the
nation in these terms. To beg is bitter, even if it is done for the fatherland, but it is more bitter
still to live oppressed as we are living. It is more bitter to see a husband tolerate insults to his
wife in the street from a uniformed officer; a mother see her son or husband taken away from
home in the middle of the night; a father, despite his age and position, find himself beaten and
harassed without any respect at a police station; a businessman see the very policeman who
should protect him from thieves taking a handful of cigars or a pound of meat or a cup of coffee
from him, and if he is refused, imposing a fine or making an unjust accusation of some violation;
barefoot children walking the streets begging alms; men standing idle in street corners; lines
formed outside foreign consulates for visas to leave the country; infinite injustices occurring
daily before our very eyes.
Let the people who see us suffer, who see us fight, who see us asking for help for the
fatherland, heed us.
Others ask for themselves, and they offer as security a house, a farm, or some asset. We
ask for Cuba and offer as security our lives. Each dollar deposited in our hands is a check drawn
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against the existence of men who have pledged to die before abandoning the undertaking in
which we are engaged. And those who out of egotism or pettiness refuse to help them, knowing
that they are right and fighting for a just cause, for a noble ideal, for a worthy principle, for the
common good, will see them die, their consciences full of remorse.
We know that this appeal will not be wasted. Already on one occasion, when it appeared
necessary to close down the newspaper La Calle because of lack of funds, we made a similar
appeal and the people immediately began to provide splendid help. The regime had to close it
down. This time we are not asking for a newspaper but for the entire nations. The contribution,
therefore, should be a thousand times more generous and more spontaneous.
The collection of funds by a movement functioning underground is a difficult task, but
perfectly feasible in this case, given the organization and disciple of our cadres throughout the
island.
Nonetheless, it is essential that the following riles be followed:
No citizen should give anything to anyone if he does not have absolute confidence in the
honesty, seriousness, and moral reputation of that individual. One must be certain that what has
been donated will reach the treasury of the Movement.
No one will have any identification or document from this Movement fot the specific
purpose of collecting funds. The only valid credential of an activist of ours for these purposes
will be the reputation he enjoys in the place where he loves or works.
No one should give a cent to any person coming from another place of employment or a
place where he says he works, so that no person who is not known in any given place can claim
to be a member of the 26th of July movement in order to collect funds.
No one will be given a receipt or bond as proof of his contribution, for any paper of this
sort would be dangerous to the person giving it or receiving it. When the time comes, when the
present circumstances of repression have been eliminated, honor rolls listing the names of the
persons who have contributed will be drafted based on reports of the members of our economic
section.
The dictatorship cannot take effective measures against this economic campaign because
it is confronted with a mass conspiracy.
Any imposter pretending to be a member of our movement who tries to collect funds on
its behalf will be discovered promptly by our militants and will be given the punishment
deserved, as happed in the province of Matanzas to a rogue named Ramón Estévez who
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undertook that despicable deception using a photograph of us passed on false credentials. No
vigilance is more effective than collective vigilance.
Any form of collection by means of coercion or violence is entirely alien to our methods.
The preceding rules for collecting funds apply only in Cuba, in which our unde3rground
organization functions. This will not be the case abroad, where Patriotic Clubs will carry out
their tasks legally.
The treasury of the Movement maintains detailed accounts of income and expenditures,
of which a full report will be rendered to the nation when its work is concluded.
On behalf of the national leadership of the 26th of July Revolutionary Movement, signed
in the island of Nassau,

Fidel Castro
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The Federación Estudiantil Universitaria (FEU) and the 26th of July Movement, the two
organizations formed by a new generation that has earned through sacrifice and struggle the
sympathies of the Cuban people, have agreed to address the following declaration to the country.
That:
1. Both organizations have decided to unite solidly their efforts in order to overthrow the
tyranny and carry out the Cuban Revolution.
2. To collaborate with partial elections after having demanded general and free elections for
four years constitutes a submissive and treacherous attitude which will not attain its
ambitious goals because the Revolution will not permit it.
3. If the Cuban Revolution, which already has the sympathy of America’s democratic public
opinion, is defeated in the inevitable struggle, the dictatorship will not offer even that
niggardly concession which it offers today because it fears revolution, on the heads of the
ambitious electoral candidates will fall the blood of those who sacrifice themselves.
4. We consider the social and political conditions of the country ripe for revolution and the
preparations sufficiently advanced to offer the people their liberation in 1956. The
insurrection supported by a general strike throughout the country will be undefeatable.
5. A foreign tyrant, Rafael Leónidas Trujillo, had intervened openly in the internal affairs of
our county and forged a conspiracy against Cuba with the complicity of a group of
officers who participated in the March 10 coup: Alberto del Rio Chaviano, Martín Diaz
Tamayo, Leopoldo Pérez Coujil, Manuel Ugalde Carrillo, Manuel Larrubia, Juan Rojas,
Rego Rubido, and a gang of henchmen led by Policarpo Soler, who left Cuba tight after
the coup d’état with Batista’s protection, in spite of being wanted by the courts of justice.
6. Weapons from Trujillo were introduced in Ciba with the clear complicity of those
military men.
7. Dictator Batista did not have the courage at the Panama Conference to denounce this
aggression on Cuba’s honor and integrity; instead he embraced the brother of the
Dominican murderer.
8. On returning to Cuba, hiding the truth from the people, Batista gave himself to the
ignoble task of accusing the Cuban revolutionaries of being followers of Trujillo, a
relationship that is impossible because of our democratic convictions.
9. In reply to the cowardly maneuver, we challenge Batista to give the FEU and the fighters
of the 26th of July Movement the weapons of the Republic, which he has not known how
to use with dignity, so that we may show our willingness to settle the matter with the
Dominican dictator and save our nation’s honor.
10. Cuba must answer the offence it had suffered with dignity; consequently, we support
armed action against the tyrant Trujillo, which will free the Dominican from an
oppression that has already lasted over twenty-five years. We challenge Batista to say
the last word or to unmask himself before the Cuban people.
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11. The weak, opportunistic, and cowardly attitude of the regime toward Trujillo is treason to
the fatherland.
12. Trujillo and Batista are dictators who endanger democratic sentiment in America and
disturb the people, friendship, and happiness of Cubans and Dominicans.
13. While the pro-Trujillo military remain in their posts, the best men of the armed forces,
the officers most capable of defending the fatherland, are imprisoned and treated
inhumanly on the Isle of Pines.
14. The FEU and the 26th of July Movement consider Colonel Barquín, Major Borbonet, and
other imprisoned officers as the most honorable representatives of the army. They are the
men who have the sympathy of the armed forces today.
15. The army, led by those honorable and prestigious officers, serving the Constitution and
the people, will have the respect and sympathy of the Cuban Revolution.
16. The FEU and the 26th of July Movement adopt as their watchword the unity of all the
revolutionary, moral, and civic forces of the nation – students, workers, youth
organizations, and all men of dignity – so that they will support us in this struggle which
will end in our victory or death.
17. The time has come for political parties and the Sociedad de Amigos de la República to
cease their useless pleading for friendly solutions – an attitude which might have been
patriotic at other times but which after four years of rejections, contempt, and refusal is
infamous.
18. As the Revolution faces a struggle to death against the tyranny, victory will belong to
those of us who fight on the side of history.
19. The Revolution will tale power free of compromises or vested interests to serve Cuba
with a program of social justice, freedom, and democracy. There will be respect for just
laws and the full recognition of the dignity of all Cubans without petty hatreds against
anyone. Those of us who lead the Revolution are ready to sacrifice our lives in order to
achieve our pure intentions.

José Antonio Echevarría Bianchi
Fidel Castro Ruz
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In refusing authorization to the Cuban press to visit the field of operations and know the
stand of the 26th of July Movement, dictator Batista has shown not only moral cowardice and
military impotence but has said the last word on the final outcome of this struggle.
He could have rendered an invaluable service to the country in this final moment, in the
midst of all the harm he had done, namely, by resigning in order to save the coming bloodshed,
for he has irremediably lost this contest.
If it is unjustifiable to rule the country by brute force and sacrifice human lives in the
selfish desire to remain in power, as he’s been doing for the last six years, it is a thousand times
more unjustifiable to sacrifice those lives when the unbreakable will of the nation, expressed in
all social, political, cultural, and religious sectors, against which it is impossible to govern has
decreed the immediate and inexorable end of this regime.
Those of us who know intimately the values the fatherland is sacrificing in its fight for
freedom, this of us who know the lives it costs to take every position and to carry out every
action; those of us who always hold before us the memory of Frank País and José Antonio
Echevarría as symbols of hundreds of other equally courageous young men who have died to
fulfill their duty, and who know how much the fatherland will need them in the creative moment
which is close at hand, with deep sorrow, with uncontainable indignation, we understand and
suffer as no one else the monstrous and futile crime being committed against Cuba.
If the right to know the truth is denied the people, how can one expect the slightest
respect for physical integrity, personal freedom, and the right of meeting, organizing, and
electing rulers?
The tyranny could not grant anything without the danger of disintegrating; the tyranny
has no other possible alternative than its immediate disappearance.
If the rebels are vanquished, if the troops of the regime dominate the mountains and the
valleys, if our forces do not fight and are impossible to locate, if what exists are small groups
engaged in misdeeds, and if against us there stands a strong, invincible, disciplined, and
combative army, as the General Staff in its cynical reports states, why were newspapermen not
permitted to come to the Sierra Maestra? Why, if they once ostentatiously sent them in a plane
to see that no one was here, why do they not allow newspapermen not to even come close to the
southern zone of Oriente? Why do they not remedy this insult among the many that have
conferred on the Cuban press?
The explanation to the denial of authorization to the newspapermen lies in the shameful
defeats that the dictatorship has suffered in the military offensives that, over and over again, we
have destroyed; in the unprecedented acts of barbarism that their henchmen have committed
against the defenseless civilian population; in the real and true fact that their troops have been
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expelled from the Sierra Maestra and the 26th of July army is not on the offensive in the north of
the province; in the demoralization and cowardice that have reached such a degree in their ranks
that women and children are used as shields to prevent the action of our detachments; and in the
ever more numerous cases of soldiers and officers coming to our side with their weapons,
sickened by the corrupt and criminal regime they have been defending.
The dictatorship did not want the newspapermen to know on the spot, directly and
irrefutably, that more than 400 peasants were murdered during the six months of suspended
guarantees and press censorship; that in Oro de Guisa in Oriente Province alone fifty-three
peasants were killed in one day; that a mother lost her nine children and husband in a single
blow. It did not want the newspapermen to see the hundreds of humble homes, built through
sacrifice, reduced to ashes in brutal reprisal, children mutilated by the bombing and machinegunning of defenseless hamlets. It did not want them to know the lies that the General Staff
reported after each combat, trying to deceive not only the people but the army itself. We were
going to take the newspapermen to the scenes of the defeats and the crimes of the tyranny; we
were going to show them the prisoners we have taken and the soldiers that have joined our side.
If all the truth of the Sierra Maestra were to reach the Cuban newspapermen, the regime would
fall by the frightening discredit it would have suffered in the eyes of the members of the armed
forces.
No other reason could exist for refusing to grant them permission. In our territory, the
newspapermen can move around and report freely what they see. There is no censorship here,
with demonstrates that freedom of information is not incompatible with military security and that
restrictions on the freedom of the press are not justified in the midst of war.
We were sure of the negative reply because we knew the deep reasons for it, but we
wanted to unmask the dictatorship, unmask its moral bankruptcy and military weakness, show
the Cuban people that they must have faith in our victory, that faith our men have acquired
fighting under the most adverse circumstances, that invincible faith always held by
representatives of just causes, because what matters, as Martí said, is not the number of weapons
at hand but the number of stars on one’s forehead. Now we can fight with the power of our
reason and the power of our numbers, with the power of justice as well as the power of arms.
The promise that we made one day to the nation will soon be a beautiful reality.
The dictatorship had just suspended guarantees and reestablished the hated censorship.
This demonstrates its tremendous weakness. It was enough to announce that the chains were
about to be broken and the rapid advance of Colum 6 toward the heart of Oriente Province would
soon precipitate the measure in the midst of an atmosphere of general strike. The ministers are
resigning, the ship is sinking, and the people are rising.

96

Meeting at the camp of Colum 1, general headquarters of the rebel forces, the national
directorate of the 26th of July Movement unanimously agreed the following:
1. To consider that due to the visible disintegration of the dictatorship, the growth of the
national consciousness and the belligerent participation of all social, political,
cultural, and religious sectors of the country, the struggle against Batista has entered
its final stage.
2. That the strategy of the final blow is based on the general revolutionary strike, to be
seconded by military action.
3. That revolutionary actions should be progressively intensified from this moment on,
until they end in the strike which will be ordered at the proper time.
4. The citizenry should be alerted and warned against any false order. Therefore,
contacts and communications should be defined and ensured.
5. The general strike and the armed struggle will continue resolutely if a military junta
should try to take over the government. The position of the 26th of July Movement on
this point is unchangeable.
6. To ratify the appointment of Dr. Urrutia to preside over the provisional government,
to invite him to select freely and in the shortest possible time his aides, and to
determine the governmental measures to be taken when the tyranny falls in
accordance with the minimum program set forth in the Sierra Maestra Manifesto and
in the Letter to the Cuban Liberation Junta.
7. The organization and direction of the strike in the labor sector will be charged to the
National Labor Front, which will assume in turn the representation of the proletariat
before the provisional revolutionary government.
8. The organization and direction of the strike in the professional, commercial, and
industrial sectors will be charged to the Civic Resistance Movement.
9. The organization and direction of the student strike will be charged to the National
Student Front.
10. Armed action will be charged to the rebel forces, the militias of the 26th of July
Movement, and all revolutionary organizations that support the Movement.
11. The underground papers, Revolución, Vanguardia Obrera, Sierra Maestra, El
Cubano Libre, and Resistencia, will orient and inform the people, and they will be
distributed through underground channels in order to prevent faked issues.
12. To exhort all newspapermen, radio announcers, graphic arts workers, and all
newspaper, radio, and television enterprises to rapidly organize in order to strongly
answer the new censorship, so that they become, as in Venezuela, the leaders of the
people in the final struggle for liberation.
13. To exhort the students of the country to maintain now more than ever the indefinite
strike already started, so that the valiant student youth, who have fought heroically for
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freedom, will be the vanguard of the general revolutionary strike. No student should
return to class until the dictatorship falls.
14. From April 1, for military reasons, all highways or railway traffic is prohibited
throughout Oriente Province. Any vehicle passing through those routes by day or by
night may be fired on without warning.
15. From April 1, the payment of any type of tax to the state, province, or municipality in
the entire national territory is prohibited. All payments made after that date to the
state treasurer of the dictatorship will be declared null and will have to be paid again
to the new provisional government, aside from the fact that noncompliance with this
measure will be considered an unpatriotic and counterrevolutionary act.
16. The continuance of any person in an office of trust in the executive branch from the
presidency of government councils to paragovernmental agencies subsequent to April
5 will be considered treason to the fatherland.
17. Due to the state of war existing between the people of Cuba and the Batista tyranny,
any officer, noncommissioned officer, or enlisted man in the army, navy or police
who continues to render service against the oppressed people after April 5 will lose
his right to continue service in the armed forces. There is no valid pretext to use
weapons against the people under circumstances such as those of today. Every
enlisted man has a duty to abandon the army, rebel, to join the revolutionary forces.
All those who come with the weapons will be received in our ranks, their rights
respected, and they will be promoted to the rank immediately above and will be
exempt from the obligation to fight against their former comrades.
18. The 26th of July Movement will reject only the collaboration of those military men
who have been directly responsible for inhuman acts or theft. Having fought against
us does not prohibit any military man from serving his fatherland in this decisive
hour.
19. In view of the news that seven thousand more men will be drafted into the army to
fight the Revolution, the 26th of July Movement declares that any citizen enlisting in
the armed forces subsequent to the date hereof will be subject to court martial and
judged as a criminal.
20. Likewise, after April 5, any judicial functionary, magistrate, or district attorney who
wishes to preserve his right to continue in office must resign from his post, because
the absolute lack of guarantees and of respect for legal procedure has converted the
judiciary into a useless body.
21. To communicate to the country that Colum 6 of the rebel forces, under the command
on Major Raúl Castro Ruz, having left the Sierra Maestra has invaded the northern
part of Oriente Province; that Column 3 of the rebel forces, under the command of
Juan Almeida, has invaded the eastern part of the same province that rebel patrols are
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moving in all directions through the entire province and that the action of armed
patrols will intensify throughout the nation.
22. From this moment, the country should consider itself in total war against the tyranny.
The weapons of the army, navy, and police belong to the people. They should serve
the people. No one has the right to use them against the people, and anyone doing so
should not expect the least consideration. In order to give the leaders of the
revolutionary movement time to act, the campaign of extermination against all those
who serve the tyranny with weapons will not begin until April 5. From that date, the
war on the military will be relentless in order to recover those weapons which belong
to the nation and not to the dictator. The people will find it necessary to annihilate
them wherever they may be, as the worst of enemies of their freedom and happiness.
The entire nation is determined to be free or to perish.
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From the Sierra Maestra, where a sense of duty has united us, we issue this call to our
compatriots.
The time has come when the nation can save itself from tyranny through the intelligence,
courage, and civic spirit of its children, through the efforts of all those who feel deeply the
destiny of this land where we have the right to live in peace and freedom.
Is the nation incapable of fulfilling its high destiny or does the blame for its impotence fall on the
lack of vision of its public leaders? Can we not offer the fatherland in its most difficult hour the
sacrifice of all personal aspirations, as just as they may seem, of all petty passions, personal or
group rivalries, or in short, of whatever selfish or small sentiment has prevented placing on the
alert, as one man, this formidable Cuban nation, awakened and heroic? Or is the self-centered
desire of an aspirant to public office worth more than all the blood that has been spilled for this
republic?
Our greatest weakness has been disunity. The tyranny, conscious of it, has promoted it by all
means in all its forms, offering half solutions, tempting ambitions, and using the good faith or
naïveté of its adversaries. They have divided the parties into antagonistic factions, divided the
political opposition into different groups and, when the revolutionary current gained strength and
became more threatening, they attempted to set the politicians against the revolutionaries, with
the only goal of beating the Revolution now and deceiving the parties later.
It is no secret that if the dictatorship managed to defeat the rebel bulwark of the Sierra Maestra
and crush the underground movement, once free from the revolutionary danger there would be
left not even the remotest possibility of honest elections in the midst of general grief and
skepticism.
Their intentions were made evident when they approved the senatorial minority, perhaps too
soon, disregarding the Constitution and poking fun at the obligations contracted with the very
delegates from the opposition. Once again they tried to divide and prepared the way for the
electoral farce.
That the Interparliamentary Commission failed is recognized by the party that proposed it in
Congress. The seven opposition organizations that participated in it say so categorically today
and denounce the whole thing as a bloody joke. All the civic institutions affirm it; above all, the
facts affirm it. It was bound to fail because it wanted to ignore two forces that have made their
appearance in Cuban public life: the new revolutionary generation and the civic institutions,
much more powerful than any little clique. Thus, the interparliamentary maneuvers could only
prosper on the basis of the extermination of the rebels. The fighters of the Sierra were not offered
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anything in that wretched solution but prison, exile, or death. One should never accept
discussions on those terms.
Unity is now the only patriotic way. Unity is what all political, revolutionary, and social sectors
that combat the dictatorship have in common. And what do all the opposition political parties,
the revolutionary sectors, and the civic institutions have in common? The desire to put an end to
a regime based on force, the violation of individual rights, the infamous crimes, the desire to
seek the peace that we all long for by the only road possible, the democratic and constitutional
path of our country.
Do the Sierra Maestra rebels not want free elections, a democratic regime, a constitutional
government? It is because they deprived us of those rights that we have fought since March l0.
We are here because we want them more than anyone else. To demonstrate it, there are our
fighters dead in the mountains and our comrades murdered in the streets or secluded in prison
dungeons. We are fighting for the beautiful ideal of a free, democratic, and just Cuba. What we
do not do is to agree with the lies, farces, and compromises of the dictatorship.
We want elections, but with one condition: truly free, democratic, and impartial elections.
Is it not nonsensical, a deception of the people, what is happening here daily? Can there be free,
democratic, and impartial elections under a tyranny which represents antidemocracy and
partiality?
Of what value is the direct and free vote, the immediate counts, and other fictitious concessions
if on the day of the elections no one is allowed to vote and the ballot boxes are filled at bayonet
point? Of what use was the Committee on Suffrage and Public Liberties in halting the closing of
radio stations and the mysterious deaths that continued to occur?
Has it done any good for public opinion to make demands? Have the exhortations for peace, the
tears of mothers done any good?
With more blood, they want to put an end to the rebellion; with more terror, they want to end
terrorism; with more oppression, they want to put an end to the desire for freedom.
Elections should be presided over by a provisional, neutral government, with the support of all,
that will replace the dictatorship in order to induce peace and move the country toward
democratic and constitutional normalcy.
This should be the slogan of a great civic-revolutionary front [Frente Civico Revolucionario] that
comprises all political parties of the opposition, all civic institutions, and all revolutionary forces.
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Consequently, we propose to all opposition political parties, all civic institutions, and all
revolutionary sectors the following:
1. To create a civic-revolutionary front with a common strategy of struggle.
2. To designate as of now a person to preside over the provisional government, whose election
will be left to the civic institutions to show the disinterest and impartiality of opposition leaders.
3. To declare to the country that due to the gravity of events there is no possible solution other
than the resignation of the dictator and the transference of power to the person who has the
confidence and the support of the majority of the nation, expressed through its representative
organizations.
4. To declare that the civic-revolutionary front does not invoke or accept mediation or
intervention of any kind from another nation in the internal affairs of Cuba. In contrast, it
supports the denunciations of the violation of human rights made by Cuban emigrants before
international organizations and asks the government of the United States that as long as the
present regime of terror and dictatorship persists to suspend all arms shipments to Cuba.
5. To declare that the civic-revolutionary front, by republican and independent tradition, will not
allow any type of provisional military junta to rule the Republic.
6. To declare that the civic-revolutionary front plans to separate the army from politics and to
guarantee the apolitical nature of the armed forces. Military men have nothing to fear from the
Cuban people, but it is the corrupt clique that sends them to their death in a fratricidal struggle.
7. To declare under formal promise that the provisional government will hold general elections
for all offices of the state, the provinces, and the municipalities at the end of a year following the
norms of the 1940 Constitution and the Electoral Code of 1943, and that power will be given
immediately to the elected candidates.
8. To declare that the provisional government must adjust its mission to the following program:
a. Immediate freedom for all political, civil, and military prisoners.
b. Absolute guarantee of freedom of information, of the spoken and written press, and of all the
individual and political rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
c. Designation of provisional mayors in all the municipalities after consultation with the civic
institutions of the locality.
d. Suppression of embezzlement in all its forms and adoption of measures that tend to increase
the efficiency of all state agencies.
e. Establishment of the civil service on a career basis.
f. Democratization of labor politics, promoting free elections in all unions and industrial
federations.
g. Immediate initiation of an intensive campaign against illiteracy, and civic education
emphasizing the duties and rights of each citizen to his society and fatherland.
h. Establishment of the basis for an agrarian reform to distribute barren lands and convert into
owners all the tenant farmers, sharecroppers, squatters, and lessee planters who have small
parcels of land, be it property of the state or of private persons, with prior indemnification to the
owners of the land.
i. Adoption of a healthy financial policy that safeguards the stability of our currency and tends to
use the credit of the nation in productive works.
j. Acceleration of the process of industrialization and the creation of new jobs.
Special emphasis must be put on two points of this document.
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First: The need to name now the person called to preside over the provisional government of the
Republic, to demonstrate before the world that the Cuban nation is capable of uniting behind the
ideal of freedom and supporting the person who, meeting the conditions of impartiality, integrity,
capability, and decency, can represent that ideal. There are more than enough men in Cuba
capable of presiding over the Republic!
Second: That this person must be designated by all civic institutions because those organizations
are apolitical and their backing would free the provisional president of partisan compromises and
lead to absolutely clean and impartial elections.
To form this front it is not necessary that the political parties and the civic institutions declare
themselves in favor of the insurrectional thesis and come to the Sierra Maestra. It is enough that
they deny all support to the regime's electoral compromise and declare heroically before the
nation, before the armed forces, and before world opinion that after five years of useless effort,
of continuous deceit and rivers of blood, in Cuba there is no other solution than the resignation of
Batista, who already has ruled the destiny of the country in two stages for sixteen years, and that
Cuba is not disposed to fall into the situation of Nicaragua or Santo Domingo.
It is not necessary to come to the mountains to discuss this. We can be represented in Havana, in
Mexico, or wherever may be necessary.
It is not necessary to decree the Revolution: Organize the front that we propose and the downfall
of the regime will follow, perhaps without spilling another drop of blood. One has to be blind not
to see that the dictatorship is in its last days, and that this is the moment when all Cubans must
put forth the best of their intelligence and effort.
Can there be another solution in the midst of civil war with a government incapable of
guaranteeing human life, which no longer even controls the action of its own repressive forces
and whose continued tricks and games have made completely impossible the slightest public
confidence?
No one should be deceived by the government propaganda concerning the situation in the
mountains. The Sierra Maestra is already an indestructible bulwark of freedom that has taken
root in the hearts of our compatriots, and here we shall know how to honor the faith and
confidence of our people.
Our call may not be heard, but the fight will not stop because of it, and the victory of the people,
although it will be much more costly and bloody, will not be prevented by anyone. We hope,
however, that our appeal will be heard and that a real solution will halt the spilling of Cuban
blood and will bring an era of peace and freedom.
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In view of the above, the political parties, the revolutionary organizations and the Federation of
University Students, united on free soil belonging to this great democracy that is the United
States of America, agree to the following:
First: Increase the fight against the regime of terror of Batista until a democratic form of
government is restored to the island.
Second: Constitute the Council of Cuban Liberation to unite the civic and material forces of the
Cuban people and organize the transition between the dictatorship and a constitutional and
democratic government.
Third: Underline that a constitutional, legal and democratic government is sought in which the
people of Cuba will be able to express their wishes and declare that the existing tyranny has not
been able and will never be able to offer anything but anarchy, repression, terror and plunder.
Fourth: Declare that owing to the dangerous situation existing in the nation, there is no other
solution but to bring about the end of the present government and to constitute a provisional
government which will preside over the process of reconstruction and summon a general election
which will be celebrated as soon as possible, so that the Cuban people can freely elect its
candidates, and offer this democratic government a solid backing so that its stability and
impartiality will be assured. This provisional government shall in no case exceed the term of
eighteen months, at the end of which the new government elected by the people shall take over.
Fifth: Agree that the provisional president shall not be permitted to become a candidate for any
position to be filled by the elections presided over by the provisional government. Agree also,
that the ministers, governors and mayors must give up their offices six months before the
elections to be able to participate as candidates for the presidency or for any other elective
position.
Sixth: Agree to the minimum program to be undertaken by the provisional government in its
work to restore order and democracy under the compliance of the 1940 Constitution. This
program should be inspired by the following objectives:
A. Immediate liberty of all political prisoners, civilians and military.
B. Restoration of civil liberties.
C. Establishment of systems of control and punishment to end graft.
D. Enactment of a Civil Service Act.
E. Creation of a higher standard of education, scientific research, technical education and the
conservation of our natural resources.
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F. Betterment of governmental agencies and institutions violated and plundered by the
dictatorship.
G. Preservation of the monetary stability and work to in a manner productive to the country.
H. Establishment of regulations covering agrarian reform.
I. The organization of free elections in the trade unions, in whose operation the dictatorship has
intervened.
J. Creation of new sources of employment and higher standard of living for farmers and workers
through the establishment of new industries and the development of agriculture and mining.
Seventh: Declare that the Council of Cuban Liberation backs up all the charges of violation of
human rights committed by Batista made by Cubans to the United Nations and other
international organizations; request that, until peace is obtained in Cuba, all the shipments of
arms given to the Cuban government for hemispheric defense be suspended by the government
of the United States, as the dictatorship is using such equipment against the Cuban people and
not for continental defense. And request from the United States and the Organization of
American States the recognition of this Council of Cuban Liberation, in view of the civil war
existing on the island.
Eighth: Invite all the Cuban civic, professional, religious and cultural institutions and the trade
unions and financial institutions and organizations to back up these ideals integrating this
movement against Batista.
Ninth: Reiterate our firm decision to separate the armed forces from the political battles and
guarantee the proper organization of same, and we appeal to them requesting that they also unite
with us and support the common objective of obtaining freedom from the tyranny which has
caused Cuba so much bloodshed, so that the present climate of hate and death strangling the
Republic ceases, never to return.
Tenth: Maintain after the success of the revolutionary goal the necessary integration to bring
about the task of furnishing our country with the freedom it needs and consolidate a democratic
regime for our nation.
Carlos Prîo, Carlos Hevia, Carlos Maristany and Tony Varona (Autenticos)
Manuel Bisbé and Roberto Agramonte (Ortodoxos)
Felipe Pazos, Raúl Chibás, Léster Rodriguez, Lucas Morán and Mario Llerena (M-26-7)
Alberto Mora, Ramón Prendes and Faure Chomón (FEU-DR/Student Revolutionary Directorate)
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Angel Cofiño (CTC/Revolutionary Workers Directorate)
Lincoln Rodón and José R. Andreu (Demócratas).
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After the treacherous coup of March l0, which interrupted the normal democratic process of the
nation, the Cuban people have opposed the tyranny with heroism and determination. Each and
every form of defiance has been used in these six bloody years, and all sectors of Cuba have
patriotically opposed Fulgencio Batista's dictatorship. The Cuban people, in their struggle to be
free, have shed much blood demonstrating that they have a never-ending love for freedom.
Ever since the long-gone days of student parades and demonstrations, when the first martyrs fell,
up to the recent battles, such as the one at Santo Domingo in Oriente Province, in which the
dictatorship suffered a crushing defeat, leaving on the battlefield its dead, wounded, and a large
amount of equipment, much blood has been shed and numerous efforts made to free the enslaved
fatherland. Labor strikes, three military conspiracies, and courageous protests by all the civic
institutions have aided the heroic armed struggle in Santiago, Matanzas, Havana, Cienfuegos,
and Sagua la Grande. In the cities sabotage and other revolutionary tactics have tested the
indomitable spirit of a generation loyal to the immortal words of our national anthem: "To die for
the fatherland is to live!"
Rebellion has spread over the whole nation. In the mountains new battle fronts have been
created; in the plains guerrilla columns constantly harass the enemy. Today thousands of
soldiers, in Batista's largest offensive to date, are being faced by courageous rebels who are
defending, inch by inch, the free territory at the Sierra Maestra. One third of Oriente Province is
under the control of guerrilla column number 6. In the plains, guerrilla column number 2 is
fighting throughout the area between Manzanillo and Nuevitas. In the central region of Santa
Clara, the Directorio Revolucionario has been fighting bravely. There have been battles in the
Escambray Mountains and the surrounding area. Members of the Partido Revolucionario Cubano
and the 26th of July Movement have also been fighting in this region. At Cienfuegos and
Yaguajay, revolutionary guerrillas are fighting hard. Small guerrilla forces are operating in
Matanzas and Pinar del Rio. In each corner of Cuba, a struggle to the death is taking place
between freedom and dictatorship. Abroad many exiles are aiding in the effort to free the
fatherland.
Aware that the coordination of human efforts, resources, civic forces, of political and
revolutionary sectors of the opposition, including civilians, military men, workers, students,
professionals, businessmen, and citizens in general is necessary to overthrow the dictatorship
through a supreme effort, we pledge our united efforts. Hereby we agree to create a large
revolutionary, civic coalition, made up of all of Cuba's sectors. We pledge our best and patriotic
efforts to that goal because united we shall oust the criminal dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista
and give Cuba peace, returning democracy to the people--the two blessings which can lead our
people toward greater progress, development, and freedom. We are aware of the need to act in a
united manner. Our fellow citizens demand it.
This unity of the Cuban opposition forces is based on three main points:
1. Adoption of a common strategy to defeat the dictatorship by means of armed insurrection,
reinforcing--as soon as possible--all the fronts and arming the thousands of Cubans willing to
fight for freedom. The popular mobilization of all labor, civic, professional and economic forces,
culminating in a great general strike on the civilian front; while, on the military front, action will
be coordinated throughout the country. From this common determination, Cuba will emerge free,
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and the painful spilling of blood will come to an end. Victory will be ours in any case, but it will
be delayed if our activities are not coordinated.
2. Guiding our nation, after the tyrant's fall, to a normal state of affairs, a brief provisional
government will be formed to establish full constitutional and democratic rights.
3. A minimum governmental program will be formed to guarantee the punishment of those who
are guilty of crimes, workers' rights, fulfillment of international agreements, public order, peace,
freedom, as well as the economic, social, and political progress of the Cuban people.
We ask the government of the United States of America to cease all military and other types of
aid to the dictator, and also reaffirm our defense of our national sovereignty and the nonmilitary,
republican tradition of Cuba.
To our soldiers, we say that the moment has arrived to deny their support to the tyranny. We trust
them because we know that there are decent men in the armed forces. In the past hundreds of
officers and enlisted men have paid with their lives, imprisonment, exile, or retirement from
active duty because of their love of freedom, and there must be many others who feel the same
way. This is not a war against the armed forces of the Republic but against Batista, the only
obstacle to the peace desired and needed by all Cubans, both civilian and military. We urge
workers, students, professionals, businessmen, sugar plantation owners, farmers, and Cubans of
all religions, ideologies, and races to join this liberation movement which will overthrow the
infamous tyranny that has soaked our soil with blood, decimated our best human resources,
ruined our economy, destroyed our republican institutions, and interrupted the constitutional and
democratic evolution of our country, thus bringing about a bloody civil war which will come to a
triumphant end only with a revolution backed by all the people.
The hour has come when the intelligence, patriotism, courage, and civic virtues of our men and
women--especially those who feel deeply the historic destiny of our nation, its right to be free
and to adopt the democratic way of life--will save the oppressed fatherland. Our great future is
assured by our history and our natural resources and the people's capacity to sacrifice. We call on
all the revolutionary organizations and the civic and political forces of our nation to support this
declaration of unity. Later, as soon as possible, we shall hold a meeting with every representative
delegate to discuss and approve all the points of our pledge.
Fidel Castro (26th of July Movement)
Carlos Prío Socarrás (Organización Auténtica)
Enrique Rodríguez Loeches (Directorio Revolucionario)
Justo Carrillo (Agrupación Montecristi)
Manuel A. de Varona (Partido Revolucionario Cubano Insurreccional)
Angel Santos (Resistencia Cívica)
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Lincoln Rodón (Partido Demócrata Independiente)
David Salvador, Angel Cofiño, Pascasio Linares, Lauro Blanco, José M. Aguilera (Unidad
Obrera)
José Puente, Omar Fernández (FEU)
Dr. José Miró Cardona (Coordinador General).
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